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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this study is to reexamine former United States (U.S.) 
President Richard Milhous Nixon's historic trip to the People's Republic of China 
(P.R.C.). Although his administration is most often remembered for its involvement 
in the Watergate scandal, during his first term, Nixon diverted from his previous 
staunchly anti-Communistic Cold War mindset to reopen diplomatic relations with 
Chairman Mao Zedong’s nation. This narrative focuses attention on how one of the 
world’s most powerful leaders decided to sit down with his ideological enemy to 
peacefully discuss their differences. Nixon’s move not only lessened international 
tensions, but also allowed for greater economic prosperity in Asia rather than further 
animosity and bloodshed. In planning and carrying out this new initiative, the 
administration utilized a methodology that relied on secrecy. 
Initial planning for this shocking diplomatic opening with the P.R.C. was 
conducted in secret. In 1971, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger traveled incognito to arrange an 
official agenda for his boss. The announcement that the president planned to make 
this journey into communist territory the following spring shocked many in the U.S. 
Nixon, until this point, had always been a strong Republican politician, who also 
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happened to espouse a vehemently anti-Communistic viewpoint. Reactions to his 
speech varied across the country and around the world. Living as they did in the Cold 
War era, American citizens also registered surprise because this trip occurred while 
the Vietnam War raged in Asia, and the Mainland Chinese supported their ideological 
North Vietnamese brothers’ efforts. After Nixon made his announcement, diplomatic 
and political winds began shifting in the Pacific region. And, even before he left 
America in February 1972, Taiwan had already lost its seat to the P.R.C. in the 
United Nations the previous fall. 
The following pages discuss the personalities and motivations of the major 
players in this early 1970s drama, namely Nixon, Kissinger, Mao, and Premier Zhou 
Enlai. This work also reviews: why these important world leaders diverted so sharply 
from their established patterns of behavior at this particular time, why these men of 
diametrically-opposing ideologies ultimately decided to agree to summit talks, and 
how they then overcame their prejudicial attitudes and took a chance at greater world 
peace by utilizing international diplomatic methods. The information is broken into 
several broad time frames, with each chapter focusing on a different stage of this 
event. This work might be termed not only a social history, but also a reception 
history, as many of the details provided were culled from media sources first 
appearing in 1971 and 1972, and highlight how people around the world both 
received and then reacted to Nixon’s startling pronouncements and actions.1 The 
                                                 
1 Several suggested articles for further exploration of reception theory and the formulation of political 
histories would be: Martyn P. Thompson, “Reception Theory and the Interpretation of Historical 
Meaning,” History and Theory 32, no. 3 (October 1993): 248-72, James Farr, “John Dewey and 
American Political Science,” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (April 1999): 520-41, 
Fredric Jameson, “From Criticism to History,” New Literary History 12, no. 2, Interpretation and 
Literary History (Winter 1981): 367-75, and Quentin Skinner, “Motives, Intentions and the 
Interpretation of Texts,” New Literary History 3, no. 2, On Interpretation: I (Winter 1972): 393-408.       
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research necessary to complete this type of project required exploring many primary 
and secondary sources. The information, once gathered, was then formulated to 
present a narrative following a social historian’s point of view. President Richard 
Nixon’s gutsy, yet controversial decision to visit Mao Zedong’s China in 1972, 
because it significantly altered international perceptions of the P.R.C., should be 
remembered as both a personal triumph of this president’s political career, but more 
importantly, as a major turning point in world history. 
National media sources were invited to cover the story that wintery week, yet 
journalists soon reported frustration at the lack of “hard news” being officially 
released about the president’s diplomatic activities. Nixon wanted documentation of 
this important event for posterity, but only a limited number of media personnel 
accompanied the president’s entourage. They provided live coverage of his arrival 
and the sumptuous banquets, but reporters soon grew frustrated as Nixon 
administration officials withheld details about the actual plenary session results. 
Domestic audiences also soon lost interest in the story, as they had their own life 
adventures to survive. 
This American president took his first controversial, politically risky, but 
brave step toward reopening direct communications with the P.R.C. despite facing 
strong opposition to this idea from his many critics. Although the later Watergate 
scandal left an indelible mark on Nixon’s long and distinguished public record, it is 
important to avoid focusing entirely upon this one single issue when assessing the 
worth of his presidency. The Watergate scandal had been settled for two decades by 
the time the former president passed away. During that time, he worked diligently to 
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rehabilitate his image with the American people. Upon his death, although many of 
his professional colleagues made speeches affirming his worth to America, some 
were not able to resist the temptation of mentioning Watergate in their remarks, but 
the overall comments remained highly favorable. 
Because this essay incorporates not only information gleaned from 
government documents, personal papers, diary accounts, published memoirs, and 
interviews by Nixon or others that worked with him in his administration, but also 
popular press reactions from both American and foreign media sources, it offers 
readers a fresh perspective on Nixon’s 1972 trip. By analyzing such items, Nixon 
soon emerges as a shy and introverted man who also happened to reach the highest 
U.S. political office. Because he made this controversial decision, and traveled to 
conduct peaceful political discussions with Mao, both the U.S. and the P.R.C. have 
grown richer in social and intellectual understanding. The Chinese have also 
experienced incredible technological and economic advancements since the 
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When referring to the P.R.C. in his book, Seize the Moment: America’s 
Challenge in a One-Superpower World, former United States (U.S.) President 
Richard Milhous Nixon reflected, “The Chinese are a great people with an incredibly 
rich cultural heritage. When Europe was mired in the Dark Ages, China was the most 
advanced nation in the world.”1 While the former American president offered this 
compliment in 1992, in the previous century, Napoleon Bonaparte had already 
recognized that nation’s latent power by commenting, “China? There lies a sleeping 
giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will move the world.”2  
During the early twentieth century, volatile mixtures of socially driven 
elements, such as extreme isolationism, militarism, nationalism, and racism, all 
culminated to produce two world wars with catastrophic mortality rates. Edward W. 
Said defined one specific form of racism in the West, which affected perceptions 
regarding peoples then residing on the Asian continent and in the Pacific regions, as 
Orientalism; this type of behavior produced serious cultural stresses, because if one 
adhered to these thought patterns, he or she exhibited the inability to judge alternative 
cultures based on their own particular merits.3 Following World War II, Western 
nations became deeply involved in a new battle against communism, which led to a 
decline in international diplomatic efforts. Cold War era governmental officials 
                                                 
1 Richard Nixon, Seize the Moment: America’s Challenge in a One-Superpower World (New York: 




3 For a better understanding of Said’s argument, see Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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around the world firmly locked themselves into fear-ridden ideological boxes, from 
which little meaningful humanistic dialogue escaped. After Mao Zedong’s communist 
troops drove President Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists onto the small offshore island 
of Taiwan in 1949, and participated in the Korean War against United Nations forces 
from 1950-53, Mao’s newly created People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) became 
recognized in the West as a dangerous enemy. By 1972, when Nixon visited the 
P.R.C., a nation slightly larger in size than his own by covering 3.7 million square 
miles, the country supported approximately 775 million inhabitants, over three times 
that of America.4  
After China turned to communism under Mao’s leadership in the mid-
twentieth century, the Chairman exposed his personal isolationist tendencies by 
initiating the Cultural Revolution. This movement attempted to ban the detrimental 
effects of the West from his shores by tightly restricting activities conducted by 
foreigners in the country.5 Regardless of such negative attitudes, Mao and his top 
advisors closely monitored American activities. After defeating his Democratic rival, 
Hubert H. Humphrey, Republican Richard Nixon became the thirty-seventh U.S. 
president in 1968, a post he retained until his early and unprecedented resignation in 
1974.6 Remembering him as vice-president in the Dwight David Eisenhower 
administration, the Chinese now realized this highly ambitious man, who had forged 
                                                 
4 “Pictogram: A Second-Rate Power: China Has a Long Way to Go,” U.S. News & World Report, 
February 28, 1972, 17; “A Guide to Nixon’s China Journey,” Time, February 21, 1972, 28. 
 
5 Colin Mackerras, Western Images of China, rev. ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press (China) 
Ltd., 1999), 184. 
 
6 Herón Márquez, Richard M. Nixon (Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publications Company, 2003), 54, 56; 
Martin S. Goldman, Richard M. Nixon: The Complex President (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1998), 
xi. 
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his previous career by fiercely battling the forces of communism, and who reportedly 
still exhibited a managerial personal manner, remained quite the politician.7 
Nixon shocked and surprised many of his fellow citizens in the opening years 
of the following decade. In an ironic twist of political philosophy, he suddenly 
expressed a willingness to extend détente toward Mao’s government. In February 
1972, although the P.R.C. still remained officially unrecognized by the U.S., Nixon 
and Mao, two very different and powerful personalities, visited together in the 
Chinese leader’s Beijing study.8 That these two men of such contrary ideologies even 
agreed to a peaceful summit showed “that past enmity, however intense, need not 
block future accommodation and that existing differences, however great, need not 
preclude candid discussions.”9 Despite many observers around the world believing 
themselves witnesses to nothing short of a miracle, the talks between the Democratic 
West and Communist East successfully proceeded. One contributor for Time summed 
up the magnitude of the situation with the following words:   
Never, perhaps, have two men who so dramatically epitomize the 
conflicting forces of modern history ever sat as equals at one 
negotiating table: Mao, the self-styled heir of [Karl Heinrich] Marx 
and [Vladimir Ilyich] Lenin and revolutionary leader of China’s 
revolutionary masses; Nixon, elected spokesman of the world’s 
richest, most advanced capitalist society and once the archetypal Cold 
Warrior.10 
                                                 
7 Carroll C. Calkins, editor, The Story of America (Pleasantville, NY: The Reader’s Digest Association, 
Inc., 1975), 335. 
   
8 Richard Nixon, Leaders (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1982), 223-38. 
 
9 “Nixon in China: The First Steps of a Long March,” Newsweek, March 6, 1972, 15. 
 
10 “A Guide to Nixon’s China Journey,” Time, February 21, 1972, 27.  
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The purpose of this study is to examine how Nixon made the brave decision to 
drastically alter two decades of American Cold War foreign policy patterns to 
reestablish social ties with the communistic P.R.C. in 1972. More than simply a 
retelling of the official agenda, this composition offers readers a broad overview of 
this important event from many perspectives. The information provided is organized 
in the following manner: Nixon’s initial surprise announcement in 1971 and 
preparations for the trip, the media’s coverage and experiences while reporting the 
event in February 1972, and details about the reactions and international 
consequences of his journey. For those unfamiliar with either former President Nixon, 
his assistant, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman Mao, or his Premier, Zhou Enlai, 
while ample discussion of their motives for accomplishing this important diplomatic 
breakthrough have been highlighted, and their diverse personalities have been 
explored, an additional emphasis has also been placed on how the American popular 
press described these important world leaders and responded to their words and 
actions.  
Many primary sources contributed to the fashioning of this work. Articles 
found in newspapers, magazines, journals, personal diaries, penned memoirs, and 
personal interviews were all essential for gaining a more holistic view of this event. 
Toward this end, writings by persons such as Nixon, his assistants while in office, 
Kissinger and H.R. Haldeman, and Edgar Snow, an American journalist who 
befriended both Chinese leaders, have been utilized.11 Nixon published quite a few 
                                                 
11 Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace (New York: Random House, 1994); Richard Nixon, In the Arena: A 
Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Richard Nixon, 1999: 
Victory without War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of 
Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978); Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: 
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books, including: Beyond Peace, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and 
Renewal, Leaders, 1999: Victory without War, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 
Seize the Moment: America’s Challenge in a One-Superpower World, and The Real 
War. All of these are valuable for researchers, as they offer unusual insight into the 
president’s personal thoughts, attitudes, and motives at different times in his life. 
These volumes also highlight his accomplishments, his regrets, and how he continued 
until his death to believe America and the P.R.C. needed to retain their positive 
political relationship. An exploration of various works by Kissinger, such as The 
White House Years and Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement 
in and Extrication from the Vietnam War, along with Haldeman’s The Haldeman 
Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, offer readers an intimate insider’s view into 
the interior methodology practiced by the Nixon administration. David Gergen, 
another former Nixon assistant who wrote Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of 
Leadership Nixon to Clinton, also provides valuable information about the Nixon 
era.12 Realizing that the former president’s negatively framed legend continues after 
his death, Gergen resents modern critics, such as Oliver Stone, for their unfair public 
caricature; Gergen believes Stone: 
seized upon his [Nixon’s] elusive nature to portray him as a drunken, 
twisted egomaniac who might have blown up the world. Those 
portraits are wrong and unfair. The air of mystery about him was a 
                                                                                                                                           
Warner Books Inc., 1980); Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, expanded ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974); Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1979); Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and 
Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003); H.R. Haldeman, The 
Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994); Edgar 
Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 183. 
 
12 David Gergen, Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership Nixon to Clinton (Thorndike, ME: 
G.K. Hall & Co., 2000), 21. 
 xviii
strength, not a weakness. The Nixon I saw used it with considerable 
thought and in a way that generally strengthened prospects for long-
term peace.13 
Edgar Snow’s many works remain important resources for researchers interested in 
the P.R.C., because this man’s personal relationship with both Chairman Mao and 
Premier Zhou allowed him to offer his readers unusual, in-depth, and first-hand 
accounts about Chinese history and culture.  
Nixon’s official Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S. from 1969 
through 1972 shed considerable light on his official White House activities, thereby 
offering researchers a multiplicity of excellent windows for peering into a shadowy 
past.14 In essence, Nixon buttresses these published governmental accounts with 
much the same essential underlying story in his own monographs and collections of 
memoirs. While perusing any of these volumes, one clearly perceives the former 
president’s adversarial relationship with members of the media. Because of his beliefs 
about their general bias against him, Nixon’s developed attitudes of suspicion and 
hate shaped how American viewers perceived the importance of both his choice to go 
to China and then the coverage of his 1972 journey.  
Archival materials explored included works published by the U.S. Department 
of State, which was a governmental entity largely bypassed by Nixon and Kissinger 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 71. 
 
14 See Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.: Richard Nixon Containing the 
Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President 1969 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1971); Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.: Richard Nixon 
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President 1970 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971); Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the Presidents of the U.S.: 
Richard Nixon Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President 1971 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972); Richard Nixon, Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the U.S.: Richard Nixon Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of 
the President 1972 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1974). 
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in the preparations for this groundbreaking Asian adventure. These documents, which 
relate to foreign policies and the P.R.C. in the early 1970s, are important as they 
reflect what information the government distributed to the general public at that 
time.15 Another valuable source for this report is the Senate’s personal collection of 
records in the Memorial Services in the Congress of the United States and Tributes In 
Eulogy of Richard M. Nixon Late a President of the United States.16 The statements 
found in this volume proved fascinating, as even though some of Nixon’s former 
fellows mentioned the Watergate scandal in their remarks, they publicly brushed this 
matter somewhat to the side to offer heartfelt condolences at the loss of a great 
American statesman. While Howell Heflin, a Democratic Senator from Alabama, 
stated, “Despite the tragedy of Watergate, I think Richard Nixon will go down in 
history as one of the most intriguing and successful political leaders of the twentieth 
century,” his Republican colleague, Thad Cochran of Mississippi, also remarked, 
“Although Watergate was a blemish on his record, his many accomplishments and 
contributions to world peace made his Presidency very successful.”17 
Four personal interviews also served as excellent sources of information.18 
Patsy Jean Jones graciously agreed to share her experiences as a young girl watching 
                                                 
15 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Foreign Policy 1969-1970, a report of the Secretary of State 
Department of State, Publication 8575, General Foreign Policy, Series 254 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1971; U.S. Department of State, Issues in United States Foreign Policy: 
No. 4—People’s Republic of China (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).   
 
16 U.S. Congress, Senate, Memorial Services in the Congress of the United States and Tributes In 
Eulogy of Richard M. Nixon Late a President of the United States, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 1996, H. Doc. 
103-341 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 36. 
 
17 Ibid., Hon. Howell Heflin of Alabama, Monday, April 25, 1994, 38; Hon. Thad Cochran of 
Mississippi, Thursday, May 5, 1994, 54. 
 
18 Patsy Jean Jones, interview by Molly McLeod Mirll, July 7, 2007, Bay City, Texas. [Hereafter cited 
as Jones interview]; Rogers Patrick McLeod, former United States and Texas History teacher, 
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the Nixon China broadcasts, as presented on Houston, Texas, television channels. 
Rogers Patrick McLeod and Jean Collins McLeod, both former professional 
schoolteachers, also contributed to this project by explaining what the average 
American family, who were busily raising children and just struggling to survive, 
remembered about Nixon’s journey and new political move. As adults at the time, 
they obviously offered a different perspective than Jones, as they could better grasp 
the greater underlying social issues involved and the later political importance of the 
Watergate scandal. During his interview, author Terry Mirll expressed his teenage 
unhappiness over the extent of the televised Watergate hearings. To understand his 
level of despair, modern readers who enjoy advanced viewing options, such as 
extensive cable connections or satellite dishes, must think about the simple aerial 
antenna the Mirlls had at their home. This was, after all, the early 1970s, when cable 
television was just being developed. While the American Broadcasting Company 
(ABC), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and the National Broadcasting 
Company (NBC) all spent a considerable amount of time providing continuous live 
coverage of these official meetings, children and teenagers, like Jones and Mirll, who 
may have wanted to watch non-adult-geared programming were out of luck. At 
fifteen, Mirll was simply more interested in watching evening episodes of Columbo 
than he was in staring for hours at a bunch of bickering old men. 
                                                                                                                                           
interview by Molly McLeod Mirll, July 7, 2007, Bay City, Texas. [Hereafter cited as Pat McLeod 
interview]; Jean Collins McLeod, former Music teacher, interview by Molly McLeod Mirll, July 7, 
2007, Bay City, Texas. [Hereafter cited as Jean McLeod interview]; Terry L. Mirll, author of Children 
and Fools, A Twisted Tale of the Vienna Woods (Oakland, OR: Elderberry Press, 2001) and 
Wonderboy and the Black Hole of Nixvy Veck (Charleston, S. C.: BookSurge, 2005), interview by 
Molly McLeod Mirll, October 19, 2007, Midwest City, Oklahoma. [Hereafter cited as Mirll interview]. 
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Other primary source documents used in the construction of this essay include 
newspapers and magazines, such as America, Business Week, The Christian Century, 
Christianity Today, Ebony, The New Republic, The New York Times, The New Yorker, 
Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News & World Report. Reviewing and analyzing such a 
diverse collection of publications preserved greater objectivity for this study, as the 
views of more conservative or liberal writers have been better balanced against one 
another. Academic journals also played an important role in informing the general 
public about Nixon’s journey that February. Many influential writers shaped public 
opinion, but also assisted members of their society by explaining foreign reactions to 
the American leader’s startling diplomatic decision. Informative articles, which 
highlighted how foreign eyes viewed American policies in the early 1970s, examined 
the unraveling geopolitical puzzle by exploring how the world reacted to Nixon’s 
surprise move, and described for domestic readers how news coverage in the P.R.C. 
was heavily controlled for the majority of that society, appeared in several influential 
domestic journals, such as the Asian Survey, The China Quarterly, and the Journal of 
Peace Research.19 The American population’s perceptions of communist China 
certainly needed revision before general acceptance of this momentous shift in 
foreign policy practices occurred; however, the same could be said for the Chinese. 
                                                 
19 The following are recommended articles from these publications: Sheldon L. Appleton, “Taiwan: 
The Year It Finally Happened,” Asian Survey 12, no. 1 (January 1972): 33-5. [Hereafter cited as 
Appleton article]; Alan P. L. Liu, “Control of Public Information and Its Effects on China’s Foreign 
Affairs,” Asian Survey 14, no. 10 (October 1974): 943. [Hereafter cited as Alan Liu article]; William 
H. Overholt, “President Nixon’s Trip to China and Its Consequences,” Asian Survey 13, no. 7 (July 
1973): 713, 715. [Hereafter cited as Overholt article]; Marek Thee, “U.S.-Chinese Rapprochement and 
Vietnam,” Journal of Peace Research 9, no. 1 (1972): 66. [Hereafter cited as Thee article]; Dick 
Wilson, “China and the European Community,” The China Quarterly, no. 56 (October-December 
1973): 662. [Hereafter cited as Wilson article]; Henry G. Schwarz, “The T’san-K’ao Hsiao-his: How 
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Despite Ping-Pong cordiality, there existed a reservoir of bitterness 
among the Chinese. Young people…had been educated to blame the 
United States for helping Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war, the Korean 
War, defense of the Nationalist Government on Taiwan, the Vietnam 
War, and it would not be easy to offset these sentiments so that 
uninhibited relationships could develop.20  
The creation of this thesis also relied upon biographies of Nixon, monographs, 
newspaper reports, and audio-visual resources. Many writers have tried to offer their 
readers intimate portraits of the former president, but he was a man who relished his 
privacy, and someone who possessed the ability to display alternate personalities 
under differing circumstances. Even though Nixon biographer Stephen Ambrose once 
gave this American leader credit for his accomplishments in foreign affairs by 
remarking, “I think that the opening to China…was first of all an act of political 
courage on Nixon’s part. It was very high risk politics, and it was the product of very 
hard thinking,” he also diminished the former president’s achievement by writing, 
“‘Because Nixon resigned, the full promise of his opening to China has not been 
realized.”21 Nixon had exhibited his bravery in 1971 and 1972, because “in the final 
analysis, it was Richard Nixon who took the real political risk in responding to 
Chinese overtures for détente.”22  
While Ambrose tinged his assessment of Nixon with a bit of a negative bias, 
Margaret MacMillan, who has also written about the former president’s political 
career, recently expressed surprise at finding “herself unexpectedly sympathetic to 
Richard Nixon”; while a graduate student attending Oxford University she had 
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believed Nixon “a man who belonged to a totally different generation, an old man,” 
and also “an appalling man,” but she freely admitted gaining more personal respect 
for him after she concluded her research.23 Richard Reeves, another Nixon 
biographer, referenced the man’s “loner” personality by remarking, “‘As he himself 
said, he was a desperate introvert in a business of extroverts,’” and even though he 
excelled in a profession where “‘most politicians can’t stand to be alone. Richard 
Nixon couldn’t stand to be with people.’”24 
This work presented a challenge, as in order to offer readers a detailed 
analysis of the importance of Nixon’s trip, many of the P.R.C.’s nearest Asian 
neighbors’ histories also needed to be reviewed, so as to better glimpse how the 
journey affected them in 1972. Newspaper articles accessed through online services 
and audio-visual resources proved insightful and added greatly to this essay by 
providing further details. Each chapter discusses a different aspect relating to this 
story. Chapter one includes information about Nixon’s surprising announcement in 
1971. Chapter two delves into the secret trip Kissinger made to pave his boss’s 
diplomatic path and explores the personalities of the powerful Chinese leaders the 
American president would soon encounter. The third chapter deals specifically with 
how representatives of the national media covered Nixon’s stay in the P.R.C, and  
details some of their collectively reported experiences. Easily recognizable American 
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personalities, such as Walter Cronkite, Barbara Walters, and Helen Thomas took part 
in this historic news event. Personal recollections by journalists such as these, who all 
worked extremely long hours that week in Beijing, offer unique insights into how the 
domestic networks dealt with the elusive nature of the Nixon administration; 
however, as many of these men and women lacked extensive knowledge about either 
the Chinese or their ancient culture by the time they landed in the P.R.C., the 
secretive conduct by the Nixon administration only further dampened their ultimate 
potential for providing great stories. 
This essay, therefore, is an analysis of Nixon and his 1972 foray to the P.R.C. 
The following narrative has been constructed by carefully studying accounts drawn 
from both primary and secondary sources. All of these resources, when woven 
together, illustrate the importance of the American president’s 1971 and 1972 
controversial political decisions that immensely impacted many people around the 
globe.
 1





On July 15, 1971, according to Nixon’s Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, the 
president “was in good spirits and completely relaxed” before he dropped a huge 
political bombshell on an unsuspecting American public.1 Nixon shocked his 
audience that day by suddenly announcing he had both received and accepted an 
invitation to visit Communist China.2 His few short words, not only reversed several 
decades of national foreign policy patterns, but also became referred to as “the best-
kept Presidential secret since Lyndon [Baines] Johnson’s televised abdication 
speech.”3 Nixon, a loner by nature, skillfully utilized secrecy as part of his 
overarching political strategy while occupying the Oval Office in the early 1970s. 
This practice was used to such an extent that it soon constituted one of the 
distinguishing factors of his administration’s methodology.   
In the 1950s, Nixon’s behavior patterns had been described as a kaleidoscope; 
as president, because he continued to display different faces for separate audiences, 
Haldeman praised his boss’s adaptive ability, once referring to him as “a multi-
faceted quartz crystal. Some facets bright and shining, others dark and mysterious”; 
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Nixon’s many critics, however, sensed insincerity or attempts at truth suppression.4 
While Charles “Chuck” Colson may have recalled Nixon as a visionary, John Dean, 
remarking on the former president’s loner personality, mentioned, “He didn’t seem to 
be very comfortable with people as a general rule.”5 When John Ehrlichman 
remembered Nixon, he noted, “He intentionally created compartments in the White 
House. He would not confide everything to everybody.”6 While his political rivals 
may have criticized his use of secrecy when serving as America’s commander-in-
chief, Nixon got results. He paid extremely close attention to his public approval 
ratings; as a seasoned politician, Nixon remained well aware that “high levels of 
approval improve a president’s chances for re-election, boost the fortunes of fellow 
partisans in congressional elections, and increase influence in Congress.”7 
As president, Nixon clearly tried to solidify a personal reputation as a 
peacemaker. In his Inaugural address, he adamantly proclaimed, “I shall consecrate 
my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause of peace 
among nations.”8 Around the world that spring, Chairman Mao evidently liked the 
new president’s message, as he ordered Nixon’s speech published for his citizens.9 In 
1969, the American leader spoke before a group of American Field Service Students, 
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directly and succinctly informing them of his personal goal of bringing real peace to 
the world.10 While in Guam a few days later, Nixon further stated he thought the 
Pacific area nations threatened this idea from ever occurring, but offered audience 
members hopeful information concerning the Vietnam War, by explaining how 
intelligence data indicated provided materiel allotments from Red China to the North 
Vietnamese had decreased from over half to only 20 percent of previous totals 
rendered.11 The following September, in an address before the 24th General 
Assembly of the United Nations, Nixon not only declared that all national leaders 
bore a world mandate to bring peace to the globe, but also publicly announced, 
“Whenever the leaders of Communist China choose to abandon their self-imposed 
isolation, we are ready to talk with them.”12  
The president continued to pursue his goal, and by July 1971, the chosen 
strategy had evidently borne fruit, as John King Fairbank, a noted Harvard Sinologist, 
wrote, “Mr. Nixon’s willingness to visit Peking is a personal coup for him as 
peacemaker, an image he will want to preserve”; Fairbank also believed the 
upcoming journey acted “as an incentive for him to complete the liquidation of the 
American intervention in Vietnam.”13 Many citizens, weary of their nation’s 
involvement in the Indochina conflict, fervently hoped this prediction came true. 
Three months later, while discussing the domestic economic situation, Nixon 
“declared that 1972 ‘can be a year in which historic events will take place on the 
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international scene, events that could affect the peace of the world in the next 
generation, even in the next century.’”14 Nixon’s foreign policy decisions in 1971 and 
1972 did not merely symbolize attempts to impress voters before a preeminent 
election, as some of his political critics quickly contended; the historical record 
clearly shows how the president repeatedly made such references to his personal goal 
of achieving greater levels of world peace throughout his first term.  
During his presidency, Nixon relied heavily upon polling techniques to keep 
him connected with the public; while his administration conducted 223 surveys 
between 1969 and 1972, the polling in 1972 “was quite extensive—it significantly 
exceeded Johnson’s total for his entire presidency.”15 There inside his White House 
on Pennsylvania Avenue, while Haldeman, “as the gatekeeper to the president,” held 
the position at the top of the “hierarchical chain of command” when it came to 
“polling and public opinion analysis” matters, Kissinger served as “both the conduit 
and screen for the great bulk of information about foreign policy and foreign policy 
alternatives that moved from the bureaucracy upward” to Nixon.16 
President Nixon was, in an obvious understatement, a complicated man. 
While his actions may have shocked many Cold War sensibilities, his gutsy moves in 
1971 and 1972 signaled a monumental shift in U.S. foreign policy. While some of his 
most stringent critics questioned his use of secrecy in the matter, many others 
believed, as Nixon obviously did, that intense publicity would have foiled his 
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diplomatic triumph.17 The successful adventure buttressed his subsequent re-election 
campaign, but, more importantly, this one decisive and risky decision finally allowed 
for the first major cracks to appear in the so-called civilized world’s self-imposed 
Cold War armor.  
Prior to his brief televised appearance, while Nixon had completed several 
days of secretive meetings with top officials, and although journalists had noted the 
arrival of two speechwriters to San Clemente, California, he still instructed Ronald 
Ziegler, his White House Press Secretary, to deny any forthcoming official message; 
this silencing of information continued until a few hours before airtime, when 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers forewarned nineteen nations’ embassies of a 
pending presidential bulletin.18 On Capitol Hill, national leaders received their only 
notification concerning the planned televised appearance shortly before the program 
aired.19 That day, Nixon flew via helicopter to a Burbank, California, NBC studio; 
oddly enough, the same one normally used by the popular comedy program Laugh-
In.20 Upon his arrival, he received an enthusiastic reception by “quite a large 
crowd…which, of course, pleased him greatly.”21 The administration “didn’t inform 
anybody…of what the content of the speech was going to be, until we got to the TV 
studio,” Haldeman wrote in his diary; in the brief ninety-second segment, the 
president publicly declared his aim “to seek the normalization of relations” between 
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America and Chairman Mao’s China, and that he anticipated the opportunity would 
allow for the exchange of “views on questions of concern to the two sides.”22 Nixon’s 
words greatly excited press corps members, who began showering their leader with 
praise; Helen Thomas, who covered the story, remembered that the surprising speech 
“made the room rock.”23 Following his national appearance, the president, along with 
his most trusted personal aides, then traveled to a fashionable local restaurant named 
Perino’s, where a celebratory dinner included a $40 bottle of Chateau Lafite 
Rothschild (1961).24 Because his desired curtain of secrecy had held, Nixon fully 
savored his latest political triumph. 
The irony of the televised event stunned many domestic viewers. Sitting in 
their comfortable living rooms, they slowly realized they had just heard their 
commander-in-chief, a man who had diligently fashioned a prior political career on 
anti-Communist rhetoric, shatter two decades of foreign policy patterns toward the 
P.R.C. As this supposedly hostile country had been referred to for years as being the 
home of “a regime whose malevolent design–in the view of five U.S. 
Administrations, including his own–compelled Americans to fight and die in Korea 
and Vietnam,” were average citizens now really expected to view China in a different 
light?25 One writer for The Christian Century described the president’s proclamation 
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as having a “mind-boggling quality,” while another Life magazine article also labeled 
the announcement as “one of the great diplomatic bombshells of recent years.”26  
Upon hearing the president’s surprising news that summer day, some unhappy 
American citizens questioned how Nixon had developed such a seemingly crazy 
concept. In actuality, the idea came to fruition after many months of careful 
cultivation; before Nixon’s plane, renamed The Spirit of ’76 for the occasion, ever 
landed in Beijing, his personal advisor Kissinger had successfully cleared his 
diplomatic path by traveling incognito to China.27 As it turned out, the eventual 
historic meeting between Mao and Nixon the following spring not only signaled the 
beginning of a friendship etched with deep respect, but also marked a new chapter in 
world history. 
Polar opinions concerning Nixon’s statements quickly surfaced, but the next 
day, Haldeman noted, “the response to the speech was surprisingly favorable from all 
quarters, even the conservatives.”28 Summing up the situation, an article in America 
read: 
President Nixon and Chairman Mao have not yet set foot on the same 
diplomatic dance floor, let alone begun to tango. Still, a fascinated 
world follows each detail of the ritual both Chinese and Americans 
have entered on to bring about that encounter.29 
While in Washington, in the District of Columbia, speculations quickly 
abounded, and questions surfaced regarding what role congressional seniority would 
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possible play in ensuring someone a place as an official member of the future Nixon 
entourage, reactions to the short speech also varied widely with viewers across the 
vast U.S.30 While many astute Americans perceived their president’s move as both a 
“bold initiative” and as a monumental turning point in world diplomacy, a majority of 
the general population at least viewed it as a “situation-transforming event.”31 
According to one Christianity Today article, “The Peking talks offer a virtually 
unprecedented opportunity to surface the truly important issues facing those who live 
in the closing decades of the twentieth century.”32 While some citizens alluded to 
their leader’s remarks as explosive in nature, the director of Harvard’s East Asian 
Research Center believed Nixon’s words signaled an “end to the Cold War”; 
however, a former U.S. ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, quickly referred 
to the whole politicized concept as “quixotic,” a “grave mistake,” and a “lot of play 
acting,” which would eventually damage international relations and “injure the hopes 
for world peace.”33 
According to an article that appeared in the Las Vegas Review-Journal 
(Nevada) years later, “any Democratic leader who’d tried to cozy up to the Chinese 
mass murderer and dictator-for-life would have had his political head handed to him 
on a platter”; ironically, because Nixon had a reputation for being “a staunch anti-
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Communist, criticism from the right was sharply muted.”34 Across the nation, citizens 
soon expressed their astonishment that political criticisms had remained so relatively 
light; Nixon had actually earned both prompt and nonpartisan applause from usually 
diametrically opposed corners.35 While Michael Joseph Mansfield, the Senate 
Democratic Leader stated, “I’m astounded, delighted and happy” after hearing the 
short speech, and Robert P. Griffin, the Senate Republican Whip, described the 
commander-in-chief’s declaration as “a stunning and hopeful development,” even 
George McGovern, Nixon’s political rival and well-known persistent critic, openly 
declared, “I applaud the President’s imagination and judgment.”36 This may have 
been so, but Peter Dominick, a Republican from Colorado, rapidly labeled his 
leader’s decision a “disaster,” and the Reverend Carl McIntire, who chaired the 
Vietnam March for Victory’s committee, also “charged that Nixon ‘has abandoned all 
moral principles—it is like God and the devil having a high-level meeting.’”37 
Dozens of theories quickly surfaced regarding the potential political 
importance of the president’s recent decision, but most of the speculations led to the 
same conclusion: if Nixon avoided an outright fiasco with his new Asian initiative, 
his good fortunes would continue throughout 1972.38 Occurring when it did, while 
Nixon’s surprise message enabled him to momentarily smother other disheartening 
economic and Vietnam War effort news, it also directly assisted his domestic agenda 
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by knocking his critics off their collective balances.39 Although his opponents 
continued to complain about the administration’s blatant use of secrecy, the former 
president later staunchly defended his chosen methodology by stressing the “delicate 
negotiations with China would have collapsed” if the general public had known more 
specific details; he firmly believed “opponents of the new relationship in both 
countries would have sabotaged our moves toward a rapprochement.”40 
Noted columnists soon added their opinions into the politicized fray. “F.D.R. 
would have hesitated to go to Berlin to wine and dine with Adolf Hitler,” William F. 
Buckley Jr. claimed, “but we are about to do that.”41 In the National Review, Frank S. 
Meyer questioned, “In 1938 Chamberlain brought back from Munich ‘peace in our 
time.’ In 1939 World War II erupted. What will Nixon bring back from Peking?”42 
Writing for Newsweek, Stewart Alsop doubted Nixon’s new initiative portended any 
true impact for world affairs; he stated the speech had the same political punch as 
“the cow’s kick had in my favorite heroic couplet: The cow kicked Nelly in the belly 
in the barn; Didn’t do her any good, didn’t do her any harm.”43 Taking “the risk of 
swimming against prevailing currents” and voicing his personal suspicions, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski also believed “Mr. Nixon’s trip to China will turn out much like a fortune 
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cookie: it will be pleasant, it will hold out promise, but it will be short on tangibles 
and concretes.”44 
In other popular American magazines, readers discovered additional reactions 
to the startling news. “The basic idea, as well as its execution, deserves fervent 
applause,” remarked William P. Bundy in Newsweek.45 While a contributor to The 
Christian Century wrote the “acceptance of Premier Chou En-lai’s invitation deserves 
approbation from all who continue to seek community among the nations,” another 
article that appeared in Time stated, “Nixon acted with determination and courage,” 
and further noted that his recent announcement had thrown diplomatic relationships 
into new perspective.46 In Newsweek, while John Fairbank labeled the president’s 
decision “a hopeful and creative move,” and characterized the planned journey as “in 
itself no panacea but only a chance to seek genuine solutions instead of violent ones,” 
he also stressed that, in Chinese political thought, Nixon’s traveling to China as a 
guest would be translated as the American commander-in-chief’s having paid that 
nation a great honor.47  
Honor or not, an article in Ebony pointed out that black leaders in America 
knew “politics makes strange bedfellows and the astute…are surprised at little.”48 In 
fact, many in this community held the “opinion that this should have taken place a 
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long time ago”; besides knowing, as the Chicago Daily Defender reported on August 
3, 1971, that when “the late Dr. Martin Luther King…once publicly suggested that 
the United States should be realistic in dealing with China…he was immediately 
called a ‘dirty nigger communist,’” another editorial that appeared on August 7, 1971, 
in Baltimore, Maryland’s Afro-America newspaper, commended Nixon for “pulling 
the ‘United States’ head out of the sand with his dramatic decision to accept an 
invitation to go to Mainland China as a step toward normalizing this country’s 
relations with the real China.”49 While some influential blacks remained upset by the 
proposed summit, and found “it hard to visualize President Nixon and the Chinese 
leaders doing business in the same room,” others realized:  
the game of international politics is played by a peculiar set of rules– 
complicated rules that make it all right for the President of the nation 
fighting a war in South Vietnam against an enemy backed by North 
Vietnam which in turn is supported by Red China to meet with the 
premier of Red China to discuss things like world peace, the weather, 
admission of China to the United Nations and whether or not mini-
skirts were an international fad.50 
As American periodical subscribers found themselves bombarded from all sides by 
such differing opinions, they quickly realized only time would either reveal or 
produce any truths about the rapidly developing foreign affairs situation. 
In Beijing, not having “fully recovered from its two vast upheavals–the ill-
fated ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 1959 and the chaotic ‘Cultural Revolution’ of 1966-
69,” Mao and his top advisors, who remained “deeply alarmed by the threats of a 
Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike and Russia’s million-man buildup on China’s 
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northern border,” wanted to “improve their strategic position in relation to the 
U.S.S.R. [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics].”51 Exasperation over Russia’s ideals 
of communism and the renewal of tensions finally led Mao to contemplate reopening 
a dialog with the U.S.52 On October 1, 1970, Mao invited his old friend and journalist 
Edgar Snow “to review the annual National Day celebration parade at the top of the 
Gate of Heavenly Peace”; “a picture of Snow and Mao together” soon appeared “on 
the front page of major Chinese newspapers,” because the Chairman had decided to 
send his people an initial signal regarding his changing perspective toward America.53 
Later that year, he also extended his invitation to Nixon to visit his country.54  
A writer contributing to Newsweek believed “the Chinese hoped that the 
Nixon visit and improved relations between Peking and Washington might help to 
offset this [Soviet] pressure.”55 “They may think the American visit will improve 
their standing in the ‘third world,’” stated one letter in The New Yorker, “but one 
wonders how this could be so when it seems more important in the third world to be 
militantly anti-American than to appear to be in any way conciliatory. Peking has 
received no congratulations from Havana.”56 Yes, the decision to open talks with the 
U.S. in 1972 meant Mao’s nation sacrificed “a certain amount of prestige and 
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influence in parts of the Communist world,” but this new diplomatic move obviously 
seemed “well worth it to gain influence in the non-Communist world.”57  
In the eyes of the Chinese, “going to the negotiating table with the United 
States did not imply an abandonment of revolutionary fervor or ideological 
confrontation”; in fact, as Chairman Mao had [already] pointed out…“negotiation is a 
form of confrontation in itself: ‘Sometimes, not going to negotiations is a tit-for-tat; 
and sometimes, going to negotiations is also tit-for-tat. We were right not to go 
before, and also right to go this time; in both cases we have given tit-for-tat.’”58 
Therefore, the daring political gambles undertaken by both Chairman Mao and 
President Nixon raised expectations in both their countries of eventual handsome 
diplomatic and peace dividends. While this may have been the case for leaders in the 
U.S. and the P.R.C., other Asian nations also soon dealt with the ramifications of the 
historic political decisions. “It is clear,” an author wrote in America, “that the ripples 
from the pebble dropped into the pool of international relations by this U.S.-China 
initiative will continue to be felt on the most distant diplomatic shores for months to 
come.”59 As for Mao’s P.R.C., in the coming years, Premier Zhou’s own efforts 
reasserted his nation’s “image of sane and responsible world power. Chinese 
embassies…were restaffed, and China began to search for alignments that would 
offset the Soviet threat.”60 
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Nixon’s travel plans elicited no immediate official response from the U.S.S.R. 
The leaders in Moscow, Brzezinski soon wrote in Newsweek, found themselves in a 
tricky situation; they had been “outflanked and [were] obviously concerned.”61 Since 
the 1950s, disagreements had worn away the strong political connections the Chinese 
had established with Soviet officials working inside the Kremlin. As Nixon put it: 
From 1959 to 1963, the Sino-Soviet bloc disintegrated over ideological 
disputes about whose brand of communism was purest and over 
geopolitical conflicts about whether China would move from junior to 
full partner in the alliance. As a result of the split with Moscow, China 
found itself isolated and surrounded by hostile powers by the late 
1960s.62 
Kissinger had also previously shown his concern over this particular issue, when 
once, only in partial jest, he “told a group of scholars that he had two nightmares: one 
that Moscow and Peking would make up; the other that they would fight a war.”63 
Although the leadership in Moscow may have initially remained ominously silent, 
observant readers of the Soviet paper Pravda eventually noted a small mention of the 
American president’s shocking message on one edition’s fifth page.64 While the 
official Soviet press provided quite limited coverage of Nixon’s planned journey, the 
Russian national news organizations publicly criticized Beijing for its “collusion with 
imperialism.”65 When the leaders in Moscow finally issued a public response to the 
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surprising international news, their statement clearly noted “no one in the vicinity of 
Red Square was jumping with joy over the proposed Nixon visit.”66 
Nixon had previously tried to arrange a Soviet “summit in 1970, before the 
congressional elections” of that year, but, “suspecting his political motives, [the 
Russians had] balked, contending that much groundwork had to be laid before a 
meaningful meeting could be arranged”; after American officials received 
intelligence that Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko “went about for weeks with a 
black expression” on his face after learning the president planned to visit the P.R.C., 
it seemed to many citizens that their leader had “repaid the Russians in spectacular 
fashion for their previous foot-dragging.”67 Following Nixon’s surprise 
announcement in 1971, Soviet President Podgorny visited Hanoi on October 3, where 
he received “a lavish welcome” and signed his name to “new, large economic and 
military aid agreements.”68 Regarding the triangular relationship between the U.S., 
the P.R.C., and the U.S.S.R., John Fairbank concluded, “neither we nor the Chinese 
want the Russians to be our middlemen manipulating us both from the only two-way 
position in the trio.”69 While Kissinger also later commented the Chinese had 
expressed great concern about their ‘northern neighbor,’ he stressed, “We are staying 
out of this dispute.”70 Even though the U.S. leadership officially expressed initial 
reluctance about meddling in family squabbles, after he visited with Chairman Mao in 
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February, President Nixon then traveled the following May for diplomatic talks in 
Moscow.71 
The news of Nixon’s planned journey affected more nations than simply the 
U.S.S.R., as many countries’ leaders soon registered their own surprise at the new 
American diplomatic overture. Around the world, people quickly speculated whether 
or not the P.R.C. would earn recognition as a key player in global affairs once 
America’s president had traveled to Beijing.72 Responses to Nixon’s short speech 
ranged from Rome’s state-run radio describing the bulletin as clamoroso (sensational) 
to the Johannesburg, South Africa, Star’s article, which called the president’s 
decision “the most needed move forward in the world’s painful crawl toward assured 
peace.”73 In France, while the France-Soir’s headlining story declared, “Le Coup De 
Nixon,” and insisted that the move both suddenly turned “the international situation 
topsy-turvy” and “may soon bring peace without capitulation or humiliation for 
anyone,” the Le Monde ran the banner, “A Great Turning Point In World Politics.”74 
News sources located in Asian countries also published varied reactions. 
Nixon’s move greatly surprised the Japanese.75 While outcry against his decision saw 
some Japanese journalists comparing America’s new foreign policy initiative to the 
infamous Hitler-Stalin pact, because governmental officials also feared “possible 
isolation as a result of a U.S.-China axis,” they “stepped up a diplomatic offensive 
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designed to illustrate Tokyo’s independence in foreign affairs.”76 Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato had received only “three minutes’ warning, and the American 
ambassador was lying in a barber’s chair when he heard [the surprise announcement] 
on an American armed forces broadcast.”77 Sato “lost face in not being consulted by 
Washington about the venture; ‘We too keep secrets,’ he complained.”78 He “tried to 
put a brave face on it, but he tearfully unburdened himself…to the Australian prime 
minister saying, ‘I have done everything they asked but they have let me down.’”79  
Sato received some sympathetic treatment in the American press, as when a 
contributor writing for Newsweek commented that even though he understood the 
last-minute notification to the Japanese government resulted for reasons of secrecy, 
he still believed the president’s methodology carried the same connotation “as if the 
U.S. had acted suddenly to send its President to Germany sometime in the early 
postwar period without telling France.”80 While W. A. C. Adie’s article in the Asian 
Survey, stated, “In Japan, Sato’s doom seemed near. ‘He trusted Nixon,’” Zbigniew 
Brzezinski voiced his own unhappiness over Nixon’s chosen approach to the Beijing 
summit meetings in Newsweek.81 Taking full notice of Sato’s obvious personal 
embarrassment, he expressed regret at witnessing the “Japanese confidence in our 
forthrightness shaken,” as, in his opinion, the situation now required a “restoration of 
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confidence between Washington and Tokyo”; after first remarking such a warning 
“notice on a development that is important to them” was “not the way to conduct 
alliance politics,” Brzezinski then also added that even though “the result would have 
been less dramatic,” the diplomatic difficulties which inevitably arose “could have 
been avoided if the initiative had involved more simultaneous consultation with our 
friends and less emphasis on sensation.”82 Taking a slightly less harsh tact, A. Doak 
Barnett, in U.S. News & World Report, stated, “We have already paid some price in 
our relationship with Japan, not from the substance of what we’ve done but the style 
in which we have done it”; although Barnett also considered Nixon’s initial method 
of announcement “an error of judgment,” he thought “the damage that has been done 
will not be permanent,” and that eventually, “both sides are going to see the 
importance of maintaining and improving this relationship.”83 As a result of Nixon’s 
foreign policy bombshell, Tokyo’s leaders suddenly awakened to the realization they 
needed to pay renewed attention to certain vital security issues, “such as national 
defense, international economic competition and the web of relations among the 
nations of Southeast Asia.”84 
The sudden shift in America’s policy direction also signaled the beginning of 
dramatic consequences for Formosa. For those who understood the past political 
history of this island’s leadership, many believed the government officials there 
reacted appropriately to the startling bulletin. Representing Taiwanese interests, 
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Taipei’s Ambassador to the United Nations complained, “the U.S. has pulled the rug 
out from under our feet in the U.N…The damage to us is immeasurable”; in this 
diplomat’s opinion, the proposed journey handed “a prestige victory to the 
Communists on a silver platter” and showed that “Communist intransigence pays 
off.”85 
Beginning in the mid-fifties, Zhou Enlai had consistently stressed, “Peking’s 
relations with Chiang Kai-shek are Peking’s business.”86 Even though Nixon 
promised his new move in diplomacy would not be “‘at the expense of our old 
friends,’ Nationalists immediately began ‘girding for rough diplomatic sailing.’”87 
Island diplomats were in for a rocky ride that summer. Having personally received no 
prior notification about Nixon’s planned journey, Ambassador James Shen referred to 
the new presidential idea as “a shabby deal,” but observers on Taiwan “reported 
concern but no depression, panic or major demonstrations.”88 The Nationalists there, 
however, had been generally dismayed upon receiving official word of Nixon’s 
anticipated trip to Beijing. Within days, “gossip in such listening centers as Hong 
Kong” mentioned “that money began fleeing Taiwan within days of the Nixon 
announcement.”89 
The following words of electronics worker, Liu Yuan, provide an example of 
a typically heard response from members loyal to the Nationalist cause: 
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This is a bad business. The Red Chinese foreign policy is masked in 
smiles, but they plan to defeat the U.S. The more eager Nixon is to 
make friends with the Communists, the more he will be disappointed. 
The free world will lose confidence in him and our brethren on the 
mainland will lose hope.90  
Nixon had written to the Generalissimo, and pledged his country’s continued 
support of national security matters in its previous containment-esque manner, but he 
never received a reply from the eighty-four-year-old leader regarding his 
government’s possible reaction if the Beijing regime gained admittance to the U.N.91 
Although the P.R.C. controlled “over ninety-eight percent of China’s national 
territory and population,” a Taiwanese-based delegation held the coveted spot 
representing Chinese interests in the U.N.92 By August 1971, an article in The Nation 
noted, “the Chinese have benefited from the headlines,” as they now seemed “assured 
of a seat in the U.N. which should probably be theirs before the President’s visit.”93 
Nixon’s brief announcement that he and Mao planned to meet had already caused 
startling international ramifications. “They will be happy to make a deal with Mr. 
Nixon,” read one Newsweek article, “if the American imperialists hand over Taiwan 
to Peking and Saigon to Hanoi and then get the hell out of Asia. Not otherwise.”94  
In the months prior to Nixon’s quiet landing reception in Beijing, the 
diplomatic situation for Taiwan changed dramatically. On October 25, 1971, after 
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accusing his fellow members of “flagrant violations of the [U.N.] charter,” Foreign 
Minister Chow Chu-k’ai led his unhappy delegation out of the hall before his fellow 
General Assembly members voted to “expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang 
K’ai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations.”95 
Opinions about this momentous event differed. In America, The New Yorker printed 
one man’s letter that stressed allowing “the People’s Republic of China into the club” 
meant simply that “[while] the U.N. may be neither more nor less effective than 
before, it is at least much closer to the goal of universality espoused by the 
founders.”96 
Deeply enmeshed in the era’s Cold War mentality, the U.S., along with sixty-
two other nations, had continued to “recognize Taiwan as the legal government of 
China.”97 There was no doubt this particular diplomatic situation called for delicate 
handling, because, as an article in Time mentioned, while “U.S. emotional ties are 
strong, the Chiang government’s importance in world affairs is small. The pretense 
that Chiang is the leader of China has long been senseless.”98 While John Fairbanks 
believed having Beijing represent Chinese interests to the world was “an elementary 
step away from chaos and Armageddon…[and that] its common sense highlights the 
stupidity in which our cherished ideological fixation have for so long ensnared us,” 
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the Taiwanese press strongly criticized “Henry Kissinger’s presence in Peking at the 
very time the U.N. vote on China was taken.”99 
In Vietnam, President Nguyen Van Thieu and members of the American 
military first heard Nixon’s startling news via Armed Forces Radio.100 Officials in 
Saigon appeared delighted with the sudden turn of events; one aide there reportedly 
stated, “I don’t see how it can be anything but favorable to us.”101 While this reaction 
showed a highly positive opinion in the troubled region, an article published in the 
Communist Party of Vietnam’s official newspaper, Nhan Dan, soon claimed, “No 
matter how cunning Nixon may be, he cannot save the U.S. imperialists from total 
defeat in this unsubmissive and stalwart Vietnamese land,” and the “Vietnam Courier, 
edited in Hanoi, emphasized…‘whatever Nixon may do,’ the Vietnamese and 
Indochinese problems ‘should not be settled by tricks but by clear and precise 
options.’”102 In addition to these press reports, while a Viet Cong spokesman insisted, 
“China has always supported our fight and our position,” one writer for Newsweek 
still speculated Beijing might once again pressure the North Vietnamese into a 
peaceful compromise, as at the Geneva Conference in 1954.103 In respect to this 
particular aspect of geopolitical affairs, an article printed in The Nation forwarded the 
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idea that the president’s announcement surely meant “Le Duan’s life expectancy as 
the North Vietnamese political leader is considerably shortened.”104 
As for America’s major television networks, they seemed poised to ensure 
their domestic audiences received brilliant coverage of this groundbreaking occasion. 
For the first time, the opportunity presented itself for citizens to witness the society 
living inside this previously forbidden land.105 In the months prior to the highly 
anticipated venture, media personnel not only fastidiously readied expensive and 
innovative equipment, but also assisted the broadcasters, those fortunate enough to 
have been selected to accompany the presidential party on its epic journey, with their 
travel preparations. As their commander-in-chief happily toured the P.R.C. in 
February 1972, national affiliates in both countries closely covered the event. 
Because the unknown territory virtually assured so-called scoops and exclusives for 
the American reporters, worldwide audiences soon watched highlights of the U.S. and 
P.R.C.’s officials attempting to establish a more peaceful geopolitical relationship via 
the newest in satellite technology.  
Understanding their president’s political record, domestic media officials 
hoped to attract all the viewers he had shocked when televising his intentions in mid-
1971. After all, with the Cold War in full progress for more than twenty years, these 
concerned citizens wanted to know why he had suddenly decided to visit the 
communists on their own soil. Nixon’s startling announcement to conduct summit 
talks with Red China certainly received drastically varied reactions from around the 
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globe. An article in Newsweek read, “We are witnessing the liquidation of two 
decades of a U.S. East Asian policy dominated by the ghost of John Foster Dulles.”106 
The question remained—was this new course of action a prudent political move on 
Nixon’s part? In an article entitled “Is This Trip Necessary?” the former Under 
Secretary of State George Ball penned the following ominous admonition: “There is 
nothing more dangerous than to rest the relations between states too heavily on the 
capricious interaction of diverse personalities.”107  
In the months immediately preceding his journey, even though President 
Nixon also tried to warn those in the U.S. not to get too carried away with wild 
speculations about possible results from the scheduled summit talks, such guesswork 
proved inevitable.108 While Nixon openly declared his position on Asian matters, 
certain speculators continued to worry his planned visit to Red China would “put the 
U.S. stamp of approval on the legitimacy of the Communist regime.”109 The 
unresolved Taiwanese political question also caused concern. Even though Mao had 
defeated him in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek continued not only to receive attention as 
China’s legitimate ruler, but also to receive aid from the U.S. government; during the 
previous two decades, the Generalissimo’s regime had “received over $4 billion in 
aid and enjoyed the protection of American troops and the Seventh Fleet patrolling 
the Taiwan Strait.”110 For those who fully comprehended these historical truths, 
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Nixon’s new idea of détente must have appeared ludicrous, as surely this troubled 
political situation complicated any possibly attempted negotiations with the Chairman 
to such an extent as to ensure total failure.  
Nixon critics wondered how the president possibly thought such a seemingly 
reckless scheme had any chances of succeeding. In addition to their constantly having 
been “at each others throats since 1949,” Mao’s government had also “vilified the US 
as a chief ‘imperialist aggressor’ even after Kissinger’s recent [secret diplomatic] 
journey.”111 John Fairbanks held less of a defeatist viewpoint. Having personally 
visited China himself, he remarked false imagery and a general misunderstanding of 
political realities had fueled hostilities between the two nations.112 Following this 
reasoning, if a serious effort toward peaceful talks concerning national differences 
occurred, then positive results would naturally ensue. Unfortunately for Nixon, his 
initial efforts showed promise, but in only two years, he left office. Almost a full 
decade passed before Americans realized the first concrete results of the president’s 
historic trip to China. 
Discussion and debate continued throughout the fall of 1971, with certain 
citizens also still daring to hope that Nixon’s upcoming Asian adventure possibly 
symbolized the welcomed “liquidation of the anti-Communist stance of the American 
Government.”113 In the opening years of the 1970s, Nixon’s surprising decisions 
brought both positive and negative consequences for many of America’s global 
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neighbors. The historical record clearly shows Nixon’s initial efforts broke diplomatic 
ice that had been left to harden in place for far too long. Despite skeptics in 1971 
quickly voicing opinions such as, “As far as anyone in this country can tell, there is 
very little that Richard Nixon can offer Peking except himself and his entourage and 
some rhetoric about the need for peace and understanding,” the president certainly 
intended to try.114 He stayed highly optimistic in the months before his journey; 
following his trip, while he understood many Americans still hoped for greater peace 
in Asia and a rapid end to the Vietnam War, he also remarked in November 1972 that 
the times presaged “the eve of what could be the greatest generation of peace, true 
peace, for the whole world, that man has ever known. This is a great goal.”115 His 
personal attitude surprised few who really knew him, because they realized to what 
extent their friend idolized former President Woodrow Wilson and his work.116  
At heart, Nixon remained “fundamentally an internationalist who believed in 
working with world organizations,” and stood “prepared to do the unthinkable to 
achieve the ultimate objective of making a safer world.”117 Speaking out against 
isolationist sentiments, Nixon once stated, “if America were to turn its back on the 
world, there would be peace that would settle over this planet, but it would be the 
kind of peace that suffocated freedom in Czechoslovakia.”118 “Nixon is the power 
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broker, the man of unabashed gigantic hopes willing to cocoon himself from old 
allies, to offend longtime friends, to seek his objective with an iron determination,” 
commented Hugh Sidey in Life.119 Soon after his surprise announcement, one 
administration official also remarked that Nixon, “dedicated to this negotiating 
process from the beginning, against all odds, is not going to be found wanting when 
the whole record in pursuing avenues of peace is plain.”120 
After twenty-two long years of diplomatic silence, on February 17, 1972, with 
Patricia Nixon at his side, President Nixon arrived in the P.R.C. and officially 
reopened communications with Mao Zedong’s government.121 A writer in Newsweek, 
comparing this event to the first moon landing, wrote, “not since the first moonwalk 
has the world’s imagination been so completely captivated by a sense of discovery, 
by the thought of opening up a new and forbidding frontier.”122 Television viewers 
around the globe watched as the startling efforts at ideological harmony unfolded, 
staring enthralled at color images of the presidential couple exploring the wonders of 
Mao’s vast and fascinating country. The real importance of this journey came from 
Nixon’s having broken the so-called diplomatic ice, which then spurred many other 
countries to also reopen active dialogues with the P.R.C.  
Besides its political aspects, the president’s 1972 Asian adventure also 
resulted in important cultural changes, as many American citizens altered their 
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collective negative attitudes about the supposedly ever-menacing Red Chinese. 
Innumerable Americans soon welcomed the P.R.C.’s culture; “it was once again 
fashionable to see good in, and even admire” China.123 A gradual decline of blatant 
Orientalism occurred, as growing numbers of Americans actively began studying that 
country’s alternate language and political system.124 For many citizens, the P.R.C. no 
longer represented “the bogeyman of the East,” and “the nightmare vision of an 
Oriental ‘Red menace’ stopped being a sufficient justification to draw the U.S. into 
crippling [military] adventures in Asia.”125  
Until his death, Richard Nixon remained an enigma. Whether praised or 
vilified by the American people, he worked hard serving his nation. His political 
career reflects more than simply the Watergate scandal, yet this is the most frequently 
conjured reference if someone discusses him or his administration. This American 
president made conscientious efforts to assist average Americans through domestic 
reforms, but he also achieved greater world peace while in office, as his daring moves 
in foreign affairs led to a thawing of Cold War aggressions and created cracks in the 
Cold War mentality held by many governmental leaders around the globe. Thus, by 
the later decades of the twentieth century, Nixon’s bold efforts encouraged a new 
generation of Westerners to reevaluate the entire Chinese lifestyle.126 
After years of fighting each other, castigating each other, fearing each 
other–and just plain wondering about each other–the most powerful 
nation in the world and the most populous nation in the world had 
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decided to recognize each other’s existence. And that alone 
represented a great leap forward.127 
Regardless of rumors about possible consequences, in February 1972, Nixon 
stood ready to begin his adventure into the unknown. Despite unfair criticisms by 
some of his opponents that his planned journey merely represented a political ploy, 
Nixon stayed true to his convictions and focused on achieving his controversial goal. 
As one reads through his personal works, it becomes more easily discerned how he 
not only worked toward providing a better life experience for many Americans, but 
also set his sights on achieving higher levels of world peace. Between February 21 
and 27, 1972, President Nixon met Chairman Mao and held discussions with his main 
representative, Premier Zhou Enlai.128 That February, when he headed off into the 
unknown, even though Kissinger had worked hard to ensure his possible success, 
Nixon had no concrete idea of what lay ahead. Summing up this sense of excited 
anticipation in the general populace, Newsweek noted the following just prior to the 
presidential entourage’s departure from Washington: 
Peking nudged the door ajar…. And like latter-day Marco Polos, they 
[the Americans] came back telling wondrous tales of 800 million 
Chinese working together serenely under the slogan ‘Serve the 
people.’ Next week, Richard Nixon will step through the Chinese 
looking glass.129 
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Chapter Two 
Preparing to Visit 
 
It seems perfectly reasonable that average Americans later questioned what 
steps turned their leader’s miraculous plan into a diplomatic reality. Just who had 
been involved, and what role or roles had they played in this historic policy 
adventure? “Seven months before my first visit to China in 1972,” Nixon wrote, “I 
sent Henry Kissinger on a secret mission to Peking to negotiate arrangements for it.”1 
By taking two separate 1971 trips, his trusted advisor successfully arranged for the 
president’s spring journey.2 While trying to negotiate an end to the bloody Vietnam 
conflict, Kissinger, serving as an Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, had also simultaneously worked to prepare Nixon’s way toward both Beijing 
and Moscow.3 
By 1971, Chairman Mao, reportedly “a believer in the revolution” and a man 
“more anxious to make China than to make war,” actively began searching for 
alternative ways to protect his nation’s best interests.4 A pathway to diplomatic 
overtures suddenly appeared that year. In a surprise move of his own, the Premier 
extended the Chairman’s invitation to visit the P.R.C. to a group of touring American 
ping-pong players; by the following July, Kissinger attended important talks in 
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Beijing.5 Though Western analysts certainly noticed that country’s continued social 
and political struggles, President Nixon’s travel plans also seemed to acknowledge 
the Chinese mainland’s “status as a fast-growing economic power”; this, in turn, led 
many observers to believe the importance of the P.R.C.’s influence on geopolitical 
affairs would only increase during the following decade.6 
Prior to the officially selected entourage’s departure for Beijing in February 
1972, Kissinger’s colleagues noted his calm demeanor. To their queries regarding 
how “everything must have been pretty well set in advance,” the top advisor simply 
and confidently replied, “Of course. Why else do you think I’d be as relaxed as I 
am?”7 In a U.S. News and World Report article, Robert P. Martin wrote that Kissinger 
had already “sounded out Chou En-lai’s attitudes on a wide range of issues that have 
exacerbated relations between the U.S. and China.”8 Citizens across America soon 
realized no one maintained “a better grasp of what may await the President in China 
than the Nixon Administration’s own Marco Polo.”9 
To begin an explanation of how this Asian adventure occurred, one should 
mention that from the day Nixon assumed control of the Oval Office, “he cast a cloak 
of secrecy around his presidential activities.”10 Nixon himself said, “I am essentially 
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shyer than the usually extrovert politician ought to be. This seems to be an inborn 
trait, which I cannot change or alter. I have a great liking for the plain people, but I 
feel ill at ease with the prominent.”11 Although Nixon’s chosen leadership “style 
alienated many outside the White House,” he deftly employed this methodology, 
which played an important role in the success of his China initiative.12 Nixon 
admitted in a later interview, “We were obsessed with secrecy. I was paranoid or 
almost a basket case with regard to secrecy.”13 As hard as it may be to comprehend 
his particular arrangement in the more modern age of instantaneous information 
technology, at that time, only a dozen men even realized he contemplated such a bold 
overture with the leaders in Beijing; while Ellsworth Bunker, the Ambassador to 
Saigon, understood what had been planned, “among those [notables] kept in the dark 
were Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Vice President 
Spiro Agnew.”14 In Laird’s case, both “Nixon and Kissinger dealt warily with” this 
powerful Republican, because his many years of “congressional experience made him 
tougher to deceive.”15 This former Wisconsin congressman, who later “became the 
architect of the Vietnamization plan,” also earned recognition “in one poll of 
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reporters covering defense and national security issues” as “the most effective, 
likeable, trustworthy, strong and forthcoming Secretary of Defense.”16 “Laird often 
argued against excessive secrecy,” but both he and Secretary of State Rogers are 
generally remembered as men connected with the Nixon administration who “were 
pragmatic and honest.”17  
Yes, Nixon deviated from patterns of behavior displayed by prior American 
executive officers, i.e. calling upon numerous aides for their assistance in diplomatic 
matters, by choosing to work and hone his strategic skills largely in private. Creating 
“a special world, walled away even from his own government,” he initially only made 
Kissinger privy to his thoughts; eventually, he allowed Rogers into the closed 
meetings, all of which occurred in the Lincoln Sitting Room, a “Victorian parlor in 
the southeast corner of the White House.”18 Enlisting the service of these few select 
top aides, and with the help of certain discrete intermediaries in Beijing, Canada, 
France, Pakistan, and Rumania, the three men successfully completed the plans for 
the complex diplomatic initiative.19 Rumania’s president, Nicolae Ceauşescu, the only 
Communist chieftain both Russia and China communicated with civilly, offered 
Kissinger the most assistance.20 Although Nixon’s representative departed on his 
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secret mission from Pakistan, it later became known Rumania provided crucial 
intermediary services for negotiating the invitation.21  
In 1969, when Nixon visited Lahore, he “had first broached the idea of an 
American overture to China” with President Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan; during 
the next few years, he successfully “used Pakistan, as well as Romania, as a secret 
channel through which to pass several exploratory messages to China,” and he 
seemed to have earned valuable diplomatic dividends.22 As is often the case in 
political matters, the truth behind certain events only becomes clear once one traces a 
monetary trail of clues. Those closely following the U.S. foreign affairs process 
during this time period may have noticed an article published in Newsweek, which 
stated, “as a subtle gesture of gratitude, the Administration extended Export-Import 
Bank credits to Rumania, with most-favored-nation trade status expected to follow.”23 
While penning his memoirs, Nixon reflected upon Kissinger’s personal 
behavior the evening of June 2, 1971. After breathlessly bursting into the small sitting 
room, his personal advisor handed him a note, newly arrived from Beijing via 
Pakistan’s leader. Described by Kissinger “as the most important communication to 
an American President since the end of World War II,” this dispatch, an open 
invitation to visit China, was cause for great excitement; the two men toasted the 
occasion by sharing a well-aged bottle of brandy the Nixons had previously received 
as a Christmas present.24 Across the Pacific, the Premier had also expressed 
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enthusiasm about meeting Kissinger, as “the prospect of crossing verbal swords with 
such a worthy adversary” intrigued him; as it turned out, because he personally 
perceiving Nixon’s representative as “a man who knows the language of both worlds–
his own and ours,” the Premier further prophesied, “With him it should be possible to 
talk.”25 Kissinger had achieved a reputation as someone who “could talk for a half 
hour without really revealing what he was thinking or giving out any information”; 
despite his great abilities and powerful position in Washington, he still lacked the 
necessary governmental authority to enter into any binding agreements, as that power 
remained with the president.26 The Premier fully understood Kissinger’s position; he 
himself needed the Chairman’s express approval before he could commit the P.R.C. 
to any particular course of action.27 
Following Nixon’s surprise announcement, national press agencies quickly 
realized the truth behind Kissinger’s recent journey, which had been touted as a “five-
nation trip ostensibly related to the war in Viet Nam.”28 On July 9, 1971, after 
traveling a complex route “from Saigon to Thailand to India,” and arriving at the 
Rawalpindi airport near Islamabad, Kissinger and three aides: Winston Lord, a 
special assistant, John Holdridge, a man who spoke Chinese and was considered a 
specialist on the Far East, and Richard Smyser, a Foreign Service officer who also 
exhibited extensive knowledge about Southeast Asia, all climbed aboard a Pakistani 
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International Airlines Boeing 707 and flew to Beijing for three days of secret 
discussions.29 Therefore, that particular Friday, instead of being in Nathia Gali 
suffering from what correspondents had labeled as “a case of common dysentery or 
‘Delhi belly,’” Nixon’s emissary had arrived in China by noon, and then participated 
in four hours of talks with Premier Zhou Enlai; the following day, after touring the 
Forbidden City and completing another eight hours of discussions, Kissinger then 
attended one final business meeting on Sunday morning, before sharing a farewell 
lunch and leaving the country at one o’clock that afternoon.30 During his initial secret 
trip, Kissinger spent more than seventeen hours in direct, far-ranging discussions with 
Mao’s powerful representative.31 
Upon returning to America, Kissinger immediately met with the president in 
San Clemente, California. As Nixon remembered it, his advisor ranked “Zhou equally 
with de Gaulle as ‘the most impressive’ foreign statesman he had ever met”; he then 
also added, “though given to occasional hyperbole, as we all are, Kissinger is seldom 
that lavish in his praise of people who are out of earshot.”32 Evidently, every issue the 
Chinese or Nixon may have intended to discuss in subsequent summit meetings had 
been explored during the recent visit.33 Not only conferring together about 
Kissinger’s official report, which was over one hundred pages long and denoted every 
word of the recent diplomatic talks, the two men also spent time reviewing an 
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additional forty-page account penned by Kissinger; this secondary documentation, 
that detailed “every nuance and impression” he had personally gained while inside the 
P.R.C., included notations ranging from a description of Zhou’s complexion to the 
Premier’s personal thought patterns.34 From all their discussions, Nixon clearly 
understood he would soon be conducting talks with “one of the world’s ablest 
negotiators.”35 
After the men completed several days of secretive consultations, an official 
press briefing then placed Kissinger “in the unaccustomed role of public spokesman 
to give the world a preview of the coming adventure”; this, of course, only served to 
buttress the impression that he was indeed emerging “as one of the stellar figures in 
the Administration.”36 “It isn’t often in one’s adult life,” Kissinger remarked, “that 
one has the opportunity to relive the thrill and excitement that one feels as an 
adolescent. It’s like being young all over again.”37 After noting for reporters that his 
meetings with the Premier had been “a very moving occasion,” he also added, “It is 
not often one can say that he has participated in turning a new page in history.”38  
According to one White House aide, the greeting the Kissinger entourage 
received in China had indeed been “enormously gracious and polite,” with the group 
being “treated extraordinarily well”; for someone who gained five pounds while 
reportedly suffering from indisposition, Kissinger also later joked, “A guest of the 
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state must have starved to death 3,000 years ago and the Chinese are determined that 
it will not happen again.”39 While occupying the national spotlight, Nixon’s emissary 
also: alluded to “the difficulty of establishing even rudimentary communication” with 
China after so long an estrangement, discouraged speculations that his trip might 
achieve immediate or significant diplomatic changes, and tried to assure American 
allies that no deals detrimental to their national interests would be made; the diplomat 
further cautioned, “We are not sentimental about this…. We recognize that the 
People’s Republic is led by highly principled men whose principles are diametrically 
opposed to ours.”40  
After digesting all the newest information, some speculators across the U.S. 
still saw reason for optimism. “If Mr. Nixon has talks with Mao–rather than just 
seeing him,” the Australian-born Professor Ross Terrill of Harvard University 
stressed, “the meeting of the two leaders will be worthwhile–and historic.”41 A 
Western diplomat stationed in Hong Kong also commented, “Those who think this is 
all fluff are likely to be very surprised.”42 Now that the American public realized 
Kissinger greatly admired the Chinese Premier, one might have then asked what 
impression President Nixon had of Zhou Enlai. Though not all the information he had 
received had been presented in a positive light, Nixon had learned of the man’s 
general character from several different sources other than Kissinger. While one 
former assistant secretary of state named Walter Robinson had mentioned, “Chou, 
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charming as he was, had killed people with his own hands and then departed, calmly 
smoking a cigarette,” and another foreign diplomat had also once remarked, “there 
was not a grain of truth in him…it is all acting,” in August 1971, one contributor to 
the National Review wrote: 
Mao Tse-tung, in ways that go deeper than the Western eye can easily 
discern, sits in the seat of the emperors. The propaganda of 
Communist China reflects their ancient arrogance, and now the 
President of the U.S. goes hat in hand to Peking. And all Asia 
watches.43 
If Kissinger’s report more accurately reflected the probable impression Nixon had of 
the Premier before his journey, what might he have then perhaps thought of the 
Chairman? While it was true Kissinger had paved the way for Nixon’s upcoming 
diplomatic sessions in the P.R.C., the president would still have no real idea of Mao’s 
personal demeanor until he had traveled to Beijing. 
By the time he visited with the Chinese leaders, the president had already been 
working toward establishing better relations with the P.R.C. for several years. He 
relaxed travel restrictions after taking office; while only 423 passports “had been 
processed for the entire period from April 1959 through 1968,” between 1969 and 
1970, “556 passports had already been validated.”44 The world’s collective 
knowledge that Nixon would soon confer with the Chairman and Premier had also 
already “enhanced China’s world prestige and placed its deep-rooted rivalry with the 
Soviet Union in a more favorable perspective for Peking.”45 Before Nixon ever left 
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Washington, D. C., in 1972, signs appeared “that both powers were trying to be 
agreeable”; while Nixon announced a relaxation of trade restrictions with the P.R.C., 
and the United Nations Chinese delegation “held an unusual party for New York City 
police to express appreciation for protection provided” since their arrival that 
November, across the Pacific, preparations also began, as a lifted ban against the sale 
of works by classical Western thinkers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam 
Smith, soon created crowded bookstores in Beijing.46  
As spring approached, and in what were perceived as genuine efforts to 
impress and offer a friendly welcome to the presidential party, China underwent “a 
great wave of repainting, face scrubbing and sign switching. Slogans referring bluntly 
to ‘U.S. imperialists and their running dogs’ [had] been replaced by blander remarks 
about ‘the unity of the world’s peoples.’”47 As also detailed in a U.S. News & World 
Report article: 
The political slogans that formerly dominated Peking’s streets were 
being painted out, and storefronts repainted. Street signs are now in 
Roman letters as well as Chinese ideographs. The capital’s red and 
white buses are being refurbished.48  
Taking note of the atmosphere in his own nation’s capital prior to the official 
departure date, Hugh Sidey commented it “was as if two decades of assumptions had 
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been ripped out and thrown away and we were beginning again. A singular spell lay 
over the city in the days before Nixon left.”49  
On February 14, after hearing an analysis of the evolving international 
situation by André Malraux, a man known as “France’s grand old man of literature,” 
President Nixon invited the famous writer to Washington for a private briefing.50 That 
evening, after Malraux remarked, “Nobody will know whether you’re successful for 
50 years,” Nixon reportedly replied, “I know that. The American people and I can be 
patient too”; the following day, when reiterating his belief that Mao had lately been 
more interested in raising his country’s standard of living than continuing efforts 
toward revolution, Malraux referred to the Nixon overture as “‘noble,’ ‘courageous,’ 
and ‘vitally important to world peace.’”51 The influential Frenchman also declared: 
In this particular historical phase of American history, I find it 
courageous that a President of the U.S., who cannot be unaware of the 
fact that the Chinese will be using his visit, is nonetheless able to see 
beyond this and to overlook this because this is one of the very finest 
things that the U.S. has done among many of the things that it has 
done.52 
  By early February 1972, while many citizens simply decided to adopt a stance 
of wait and see, an article printed in Life reflected upon how Nixon “offered 
contradictory instructions as to how we were to regard the trip as a watershed, an 
event comparable to going to the moon, and as something from which great things 
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were not to be expected.”53 Though such mixed signals emanated from the Oval 
Office, on the eve of his boss’s historic journey, Kissinger aimed to accomplish a 
major objective. For all his previous diplomatic efforts to end in success, he still 
needed to help ensure that Nixon, Mao, and Zhou took appropriate “measure of each 
other and establish[ed] some common base”; believing that these important leaders 
just needed to discover how “each [was] an essentially reliable man,” and, therefore, 
capable of forging a new understanding and solid relationship, once Nixon’s 
entourage landed in China, Kissinger perceived reasons for hope, because, “for the 
first time, the two cultures and two societies [were] meeting on a level of equality.”54 
The president, like his favored advisor, also remained highly optimistic about his 
diplomatic mission. As for the American viewing public, however, they could do 
little else than simply wait for the event’s coverage to appear on their living room 
television sets.  
By 1971, President Nixon had made a decision and then worked to develop 
the appropriate strategy to ensure a journey to the P.R.C. became a reality. His 
excessive use of secrecy when devising this overture remains captivating. In a world 
which now features faxes, cell phones, internet connections, and an extremely pushy 
and intrusive paparazzi, global citizens are often kept appraised about the activities of 
important people on a twenty-four hour basis. In the early 1970s, however, due to 
Nixon’s careful planning and Kissinger’s excellent performance as a diplomatic 
representative, the president’s trip to the P.R.C. the following spring progressed 
smoothly. The Democratic West once again literally sat down to eat at the same table 
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with the Communistic West. Reportedly, the president’s “own inhibitions seemed to 
relax more agreeably at Peking’s great banquet hall; [even still,] no one would expect 
Richard Nixon to be easily seduced by Communists, even when savoring the biggest 
moment of his life.”55 
When considering the summit talks that took place in February 1972, it is 
important to realize the decision for the U.S. and P.R.C. to negotiate their political 
relationship “was Mao’s initiative as much as Nixon’s.”56 As high levels of rancor 
had existed over two decades between their countries, why in the world, modern 
readers may ask, had the president ever thought the Chinese leader would welcome 
him within his borders? Other questions posed might include the following: who were 
Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, what might Nixon have hoped to 
accomplish by visiting these two Communist revolutionaries, who had been isolated 
from larger geopolitical affairs for years, was Nixon suddenly not the same dangerous 
capitalist constantly facing denigration in Asian newspapers, and was his being the 
leader of a country currently at war with one of the P.R.C.’s allies simply ignored? 
After having decided their nation stood ready for positive changes, Mao and Zhou 
believed a summit with the American would achieve results, because “if you do not 
talk with the head, who else should you talk with? If you talk with people of second 
or third rank, instead of the head, the issues cannot be solved.”57 
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In 1971, at age seventy-seven, Chairman Mao had “not chosen to stand in the 
way of his country’s slow move toward moderation.”58 Isolationist policies which 
developed inside his country stemmed from that nation’s citizens having been 
historically “preyed upon by foreign powers, [ranging] from Britain to Japan”; it 
seemed to some observers that “China feared foreigners because it had good reasons 
for fearing foreigners, not because insularity is a feature of the Chinese character.”59 
The man who agreed to meet with President Nixon in 1972 was already not only “one 
of the 20th century’s major leaders,” but also “an iconic figure approaching the 
stature of Buddha as a symbol in China”; Mao’s decision “to open relations with the 
United States marked a sharp turn from his fanatical leftism and his ultra-isolationist 
foreign policy.”60 
In 1949, two singular events occurred which heightened worldwide anxieties 
about communism—“the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb,” and the rebels 
under Mao Zedong’s leadership created the P.R.C. after forcing Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek’s regime onto nearby Taiwan, a region thereafter considered “a 
renegade province.”61 The P.R.C. developed and detonated its own nuclear device in 
1964, but this technological advancement came at a terrible price. Critics of Chairman 
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Mao have since asserted “he did as much damage to mankind as [Adolf] Hitler and 
[Joseph] Stalin,” due to more than 70 million Chinese dying in peacetime under his 
leadership.62 In response to negative reports regarding deteriorating social conditions 
within his country, Mao reportedly simply remarked, “Educate the peasants to eat 
less,” and “Death has benefits. They can fertilize the land.”63 
As the book written by the Chairman’s former personal physician, The Private 
Life of Chairman Mao, explained, “Mao had no close friends and he rarely interacted 
with other members of the top leadership except at formal meetings and conferences”; 
although he might have listened “to properly stated criticisms of policy (but not of 
himself),” as no one desired being “cast out of the inner circle” or falling “subject to 
disciplinary punishment,” few dared speak of such matters.64 The Chinese leader 
rarely ventured into public view, but on those rare occasions, “the party faithful 
would wave the little red book; the collection of Mao quotations everyone in China 
was ordered to carry and never to question.”65 For many Western observers, 
therefore, Chairman Mao resembled “a mob boss, appearing to be totally in charge 
but perpetually at work to keep his captains off-balance, lest one challenge him.”66 It 
certainly seemed that under his watchful eye, the P.R.C. had turned “into an isolated, 
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exhausted, unpredictable state run by an apparent madman–[even worse,] one armed 
with nuclear weapons.”67 At the time of their meeting that spring, however, Mao still 
remained “the potentate at whose word all trembled as bevies of young ladies chosen 
by his aides ministered to his wants.”68 
As the 1960s drew to a close, and “overruling the hesitancies and objections 
of his subordinates,” the Chairman decided his country “had nothing to gain by 
persisting in its self-imposed isolation and much to hope for from a show of cordial 
relations with the United States.”69 Often saying that “good can come out of bad and 
that bad people can be made good–by experience and right teaching,” the Chairman 
believed the Vietnam experience “had made Nixon relatively ‘good’”; the Chinese 
leader also once stressed “‘Nixon might be deceitful…but perhaps a little bit less so 
than some others.’”70 Mao’s impression of Kissinger was less favorable; however, in 
the long run, it made little difference whether or not he believed Nixon’s top advisor 
was “just a funny little man…shuddering all over with nerves.”71 Regardless of 
whether or not the Americans obviously represented monopoly capitalism, it seems 
Mao must have decided reconciliation with the foreigners represented the key to his 
nation achieving its larger goal of international accountability, because he declared he 
“would be happy to talk with him [Nixon], either as a tourist or as President”; he 
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clearly understood “the current problems between his country and America would 
have to be resolved by Nixon.”72  
In his book, The Real War, Nixon magnanimously credited this powerful 
communist for the success of his historic visit, as the Chairman took “the 
revolutionary step of reaching out to the United States and fundamentally altered the 
balance of power in the world.”73 Of course, Mao had also astutely gambled that his 
drastic move would positively affect relations with the U.S.S.R. In the past, he and 
Stalin had enjoyed an amicable working relationship, perhaps because the Soviet 
Premier had “spotted Mao as probably the guy in the Chinese Communist Party who 
was most like himself…[with] long range vision.”74 However, Stalin had been dead 
since 1953. A “major dogmatic rift over the idea of ‘permanent revolution’” still 
caused diplomatic difficulties, and, as recent escalations in border troubles had also 
increased national security concerns, the Chairman agreed to follow a path leading 
toward rapprochement with the Americans; the P.R.C. now “wanted to make the 
Soviet Union nervous,” and the leadership in Moscow less self-assured when 
conducting international affairs.75  
In mid-1971, the news concerning Nixon’s upcoming journey spread like 
wildfire around the world. In America, most citizens knew their leader planned to 
travel to Red China, but as spring arrived, their questions about just who and what he 
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would likely encounter in the P.R.C. still remained to a large extent unanswered by 
White House officials. As one former U.S. Army member warned, “China’s 
Communist leaders operate like old-style shopkeepers who considered anyone a fool 
who agreed to the first price without bargaining. They operate strictly on the principle 
of caveat emptor––let the buyer, or negotiator, beware.”76 As Time pointed out in 
February 1972, Nixon would not be dealing with young men once he entered into 
discussions with the communists; meeting the Chairman and Premier, aged seventy-
eight and seventy-three respectfully, the president faced “negotiations with a two-man 
gerontocracy whose days must be numbered, actuarially if not necessarily in political 
terms.”77 Any slighting of the Chinese leaders’ abilities to maneuver tricky diplomatic 
situations based solely on their advanced ages, however, should not have been 
believed in this instance, because, as one contributor to U.S. News and World Report 
later noted, Nixon certainly met with “two of the toughest–and most ruthless–
Communist revolutionaries of this century” while he was in Beijing.78 André Malraux 
had already informed the American leader he would “be meeting with a colossus, but 
a colossus facing death”; Mao had been further described as a man who had 
experienced “a fantastic destiny and who believes that he is acting out the last act of 
his lifetime.”79 Nixon had also been cautioned that the Chairman failed to operate 
“within a rational framework”; there was “something of the sorcerer in him,” Malraux 
                                                 
76 Quote by Brigadier General Frank Dorn, U.S. Army (Retired), in “The Hard Bargainers Facing 
Nixon,” U.S. News & World Report, February 28, 1972, 20. 
 
77 “Chou: The Man in Charge,” Time, February 21, 1972, 30. 
 
78 “The Hard Bargainers Facing Nixon,” U.S. News & World Report, February 28, 1972, 18. 
 
79 Nixon, In the Arena, 13. 
 50
had insisted. “He is a man inhabited by a vision, possessed by it.”80 Disregarding such 
vivid and mystical characterizations, Nixon later reflected that upon personally 
meeting Mao, he had clearly understood the Chinese leader’s “strong sense of his 
own mortality…. He wanted to be sure that the directions he had set China on would 
last, and he also wanted China to be secure enough so that they could last.”81 
Whether the popular press labeled Mao as a powerful sorcerer or as a 
dangerous communist revolutionary notwithstanding, an article in Time commented 
that “the regime’s suave spokesman and negotiator,” Premier Zhou Enlai, a man 
recognized as “a brilliant, subtle, ruthless and endlessly flexible statesman…at the 
apex of his extraordinary career,” would most likely “deal with the President on the 
issues.”82 After reading such colorful descriptions of Zhou, many Americans also 
understood he was “a builder, not a poet.”83 According to Eric Chou, a “former editor 
of a Chinese Communist newspaper and close associate” of Mao and the Premier, 
Zhou excelled at negotiations and always rendered “Communist ideology and ideas 
into a plain language less repulsive to the Western ear”; while this may have been 
true, the former newsman also added, “But this does not mean he [Zhou] will depart 
from the line firmly laid down by Chairman Mao.”84 Upon hearing Nixon’s plans, 
journalist Edgar Snow welcomed the idea. As not “merely an old and trusted friend” 
to both Chinese leaders, Snow had also proven himself “one of the few Westerners 
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visiting China with a real background of knowledge of the country.”85 Offering an 
analysis of the future situation in Beijing, Snow remarked the Premier would 
“probably do the nitty-gritty work,” with his boss remaining “behind the scenes. But 
the final decisions will be Mao’s.”86 
Over several decades, this powerful duo had constructed the P.R.C. In his 
book, The Long Revolution, Snow described the Chinese leaders’ professional 
relationship as a successful symbiosis; however, he also stressed, despite their 
strikingly different styles and personalities, “Mao and Chou complement each other 
as a tandem based on thirty-seven years of trust and interdependence”; Zhou, working 
as “a master of policy implementation with an infinite capacity for detail,” 
counterbalanced the Chairman’s powerful position, thereby serving as “Mao’s 
indispensable alter ego.”87 Eric Chou succinctly described their successful partnership 
when he simply stated, “Mao is the brain and Chou is the mouth.”88 
Just who was this Zhou Enlai who welcomed Kissinger into the P.R.C.? By 
July 1971, a Time article noted, “Mao may still be the Chairman, but Chou has 
emerged as China’s unquestioned chief executive officer, ruling the country through 
what amounts to a working coalition of old-line- and old-aged- party bureaucrats and 
army officers.”89 No definitive definition of character ever appeared when American 
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media sources tried to describe the Chinese Premier. According to one Time article, 
few people hated him; however, a U.S. diplomat, who remembered Zhou from the 
1940s, reflected, “he was ‘the smoothest liar I ever met. Whether what he told you 
was the straight truth or an out-and-out lie, he always projected total sincerity. And 
yet he was impossible to dislike.’”90 In Leaders, Nixon offered a much nicer 
characterization when he labeled Zhou as “a Communist revolutionary and a 
Confucian gentleman, a devoted ideologue and a calculating realist, a political 
infighter and a grand conciliator.”91 The former American president then also added: 
Enlai translates as ‘coming of grace,’ a name that succinctly captured 
his presence and disposition. Zhou was unassuming but quietly strong. 
He conveyed immense charm and poise through his graceful 
movements and erect, easy stance. He faithfully observed the old 
Chinese rule in personal and political relations of never ‘breaking the 
surface.’92  
By 1970, average Americans had already seen Zhou’s name accompanied by 
quite a variety of adjectives; articles described Mao’s cohort as not only “a political 
thug and a professional assassin,” but also someone who had “killed men with his 
own hands, a ruthless intriguer, a conscienceless liar, [and] a saber-toothed political 
assassin.”93 In July 1971, while reporting that past references to the Premier had 
included the terms: “brilliant, arrogant, suave, skillful, calculating, resilient, 
persuasive, ruthless and devious,” Newsweek also noted Beijing’s “‘indispensable 
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man’ still gazed out at events through alert and intense eyes.”94 Though Zhou may 
have received some credit for his “charm and diplomatic skill,” many of his critics 
still believed he “had a dark side as a ruthless killer dating back to the 1920s and 
[remained a man] who had been the rabbit in Mao’s headlights for four decades.”95 
After learning of the lengthy negotiation sessions Kissinger had attended while 
paving his boss’s path to China, Edgar Snow expressed no great surprise. This mild 
reaction occurred due to the dedicated Premier having once told Snow he “had taken 
one vacation–a week when he was ill–in ten years.”96 
As a consummate diplomat, Zhou remained loyal to not only Mao, but also to 
his job and the preservation of the P.R.C. One Kuomintang official in Taiwan 
obviously recognized the Premier’s prowess as a statesman, because he openly 
admitted, “If we had only had Zhou on our side in the civil war, today it might be 
Mao who was in exile in Taiwan–and we would be in Peking.”97 As Nixon’s 
departure date neared, some citizens may have wondered to themselves if their 
president would be either prudent or safe in attempting any type of diplomatic talks 
with this man. What would happen if the Premier possessed the determined, and quite 
possibly lethal, personality they had either read or heard described in the past? 
Whether the P.R.C. appeared as “a terrifying monolith of world revolution or an 
insular irrelevance” to those perusing American popular press accounts, Mao and 
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Zhou both ultimately desired recognition as serious statesmen; President Nixon 
seemed “the man to help them, because that’s what Nixon wanted for himself.”98  
During his visit to Beijing that spring, Nixon “met with Zhou for over fifteen 
hours of formal one-to-one negotiations,” thereby coming “to know him well and to 
respect him greatly.”99 While speaking to Zhou’s wife when once again visiting the 
P.R.C. in 1976, Nixon spoke highly of her husband by stating, “he was always firm 
but courteous…. He never felt it necessary, as the Russian leaders so obviously did, 
to prove his manhood before his aides”; in rather “stark contrast to the antics of 
[Nikita Sergeyevich] Khrushchev and the theatrics of [Leonid Ilyich] 
Brezhnev…Zhou never raised his voice, never pounded the table, never threatened to 
break off talks in order to force a concession.”100 
Kissinger’s positive opinion about Zhou only continued to improve after he 
returned to the P.R.C. with Nixon in February 1972. Though he once likened the 
Premier “to a cobra that sits quietly, poised to strike, and then springs at the 
opportune moment,” he also later freely admitted his admiration of Zhou’s personal 
diplomatic skills.101 While many who met with Mao’s top advisor “invariably found 
him immensely civilized, reasonably cosmopolitan and statesmanlike,” Kissinger also 
insisted, “he is not a petty man. He has large views.”102 Marveling at Zhou’s ability to 
be “equally at home in philosophy, reminiscence, historical analysis, tactical probes, 
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[and] humorous repartee,” the former emissary unabashedly expressed his high 
personal regard for “Chou Enlai, [who]…was one of the two or three most impressive 
men I have ever met.”103 Nixon’s eventual successor, Gerald Rudolph Ford, Jr., while 
recalling Zhou’s pleasantness as he conducted official conversations, also later 
commented, “I never had a more interesting political discussion”; taking active note 
of the Premier’s probing nature, Ford had also quickly realized Zhou was “very well 
informed about domestic as well as foreign policies of the United States,” and proved 
himself “imposing in his intelligence and his knowledge, and fluent in discussing 
issues.”104 
Nixon’s planned springtime odyssey certainly captured the attention of 
millions, as people all around the globe considered not only the complex and 
fascinating personalities expected to participate in the proposed summit meetings, but 
also the event’s possible contributions toward peace in Asia. Alluding to yet another 
modern leap into the unknown, Nixon repeatedly compared his upcoming journey 
with the groundbreaking Apollo 11 moon flight, as no one could be exactly sure what 
would transpire in China.105 Even before he left Washington D. C., the president 
attempted to stem the escalating levels of speculation by clearly stating, “I go to 
Peking without illusions.”106 By early February 1972, this presidential adventure 
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stood poised to “go down as a pivotal event of history,” and, as one writer explained 
the situation: 
The Peking talks offer a virtually unprecedented opportunity to surface 
the truly important issues facing those who live in the closing decades 
of the twentieth century. There are so many disagreements between the 
two countries that the adoption of an agenda can in itself be counted as 
no small marvel.107 
With all the diplomatic preparations taken care of, the world waited to see if 
these statesmen, who displayed very different personality traits, would be able to 
conduct peaceful summit talks. As the spring arrived, the media also worked 
frantically to finalize their own preparations, so that details of the Nixon journey 
could be successfully beamed back to American audiences via satellite. In only a few 
short weeks, if everything went as planned, Nixon would enjoy another personal 
political triumph. In February 1972, history would also be made when President 
Nixon and Chairman Mao Zedong met in Beijing.108
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Televising the Historic Week 
It was perhaps inevitable that America’s perceptions of China would 
spin full circle…it is not so much China that has changed, but the mind 
and the mood of the U.S.1 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, many people in the U.S. thought they understood the 
Chinese, and their attitudes about those living under the Chairman’s rule remained 
highly negative. These citizens knew full well any and all of those Commie Bastards, 
no matter where they lived, spelled nothing but trouble.2 While this posture prevailed 
during the Cold War’s heyday, the decline of the P.R.C.’s Cultural Revolution invited 
renewed study of the communistic lifestyle. As the 1960s progressed, further 
advances in technology also meant an ever-increasing number of households all 
across the U.S. began receiving televised broadcast programming. By the early 1970s, 
“TV became the medium of social discourse in America as important as music had 
been in the 60s. Throughout the decade television was the medium through which 
America looked at itself.”3 
Nixon knew how important such coverage had become for modern politicians. 
Even though he fully understood this, he still despised most journalists for being 
liberal-biased ‘clowns’ who hated him.4 After backing “President Truman’s Marshall 
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Plan and prosecuting [Alger] Hiss made his political career,” Nixon insisted his 
actions had “set liberals and the liberal press forever against him.”5 He remained 
firmly convinced his enemies constantly schemed against him, resented his levels of 
popularity with voters, and wished for his ultimate downfall.6 By 1968, when Nixon 
arrived in Washington D. C., “with rare exceptions he regarded the press as if not a 
monolithic enemy at least 95% opposed to him.”7 During his presidency, “the press 
gave Richard Nixon very little credit for anything,” a fact which continuously 
frustrated him, but “in diplomacy, images are weapons. They trigger sentiments and 
alter minds.”8 By 1972, although he retained his deep distrust of the media, Nixon 
also realized he needed favorable coverage of his Beijing visit; his belief that the 
television camera had bested print sources in efficiency led Kissinger to once rather 
unkindly comment: “Television in front of the President is like alcohol in front of an 
alcoholic.”9  
Because his upcoming journey seemed imbued with mammoth importance, 
Nixon believed it therefore absolutely necessitated such exposure; however, network 
executives soon wondered just how much access their people would have to the 
planned events, and then how much of the president’s scheduled agenda they could 
realistically expect to film. Realizing Nixon had intentionally limited his traveling 
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party to thirty-seven persons, so as not to overwhelm his Chinese hosts, questions 
also arose concerning how many of their personnel they should expect to accompany 
Nixon.10 Just as the issues of seniority and inclusion quickly surfaced among 
lawmakers on Capitol Hill, speculation and debates now also raged about who should 
be granted coveted White House clearances. Touting the upcoming journey as “the 
most newsworthy presidential excursion abroad since World War II,” Time magazine 
informed its readers, “The number of newsmen along to report it will be tightly 
restricted.”11 Regardless of whether the trip’s highlights eventually unfolded on 
television, radio, or on the printed page, one columnist noted, “The White House will 
now have to make the tough decisions on who will and will not go and Ziegler is sure 
to be damned by the disappointed.”12  
As the administration received over 2,000 applications for a seat aboard the 
press plane, Nixon handpicked the journalists; he heavily favored the television 
networks, and quite enjoyed refusing places for his major critics’ personnel, such as 
those at The New York Times.13 Because the president sat “in the White House going 
over the manifest of the reporters who [were] going on the trip, crossing off some 
bureau chief because he wrote a nasty story about him during the [1962 California] 
gubernatorial race,” complaints were heard regarding his choices.14 With such a 
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diverse field of candidates and competing interests, Nixon’s press secretary astutely 
surmised he personally would face criticism once the administration released a 
finalized list.  
Although the Premier “had suggested to Kissinger…that ten journalists might 
be the right number to accompany Nixon,” after successful negotiations, the 
distribution of available seats occurred in the following way: twenty-two for daily 
newspapers, eighteen for television and radio personalities, six for wire services, and 
an additional six for major national magazines; complaints arose, however, because 
the television networks and daily newspapers had each expected approximately thirty 
spots, and the national magazines and wire services each desired another twenty.15 
“The People’s Republic,” Ziegler stated, “proposed limiting the U.S. press contingent 
to a far lower figure than 80–which is eight times bigger than any press group 
previously allowed to visit Red China”; bearing this information in mind, it scarcely 
seems unreasonable that he also later commented, “I think…we should all be very 
pleased with that figure.”16 One Time magazine contributor obviously recognized and 
appreciated Ziegler’s tricky position when he wrote the Nixon administration “sought 
the widest possible audience in selecting 24 newspaper correspondents who represent 
119 dailies,” but he then also charged that certain invited persons, namely “William 
Buckley, Joseph Kraft and Richard Wilson…could analyze just as well from afar.”17 
While some eliminated from participation either claimed a clear bias against 
the print media, or speculated accusingly that the Nixon White House was quietly 
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attempting to manage the news, other disgruntled correspondents also claimed Ziegler 
had violated an earlier pledge, which supposedly guaranteed weighted preferences to 
those organizations that regularly monitored White House events.18 When Newsday 
editor David Laventhol heard the official numbers, because his publication 
consistently provided this type of coverage, and also had a circulation larger than six 
of the dailies awarded seats, he complained at the unfair allotments; his attitude was 
not without sympathy from his competitors, as CBS News president Richard Salant 
stated, “‘I don’t understand why the print medium is being so short-changed. I’d be 
very displeased if I were they.’”19 While his boss expressed doubts about the finalized 
list, Walter Cronkite saw nothing wrong with the Nixon administration’s decisions. 
“‘Television is a cumbersome medium,’ declared Cronkite.… ‘It takes about four TV 
people to every one reporter to cover such a story.’”20 Ziegler, echoing Cronkite’s 
sentiments, pragmatically commented that “broadcast journalism requires more 
people,” and, addressing United Press International’s (UPI) Helen Thomas, he 
reiterated, “after all, it is a picture story”; despite statements such as these, negative 
dispositions persisted once it became commonly known twelve of the seventeen so-
called television technicians making the official list were actually ABC, CBS, and 
NBC executives.21  
These sorts of contentions aside, financial aspects also featured prominently in 
the minds of top media executives, as the Chinese stipulations included the request 
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that any expenses incurred by attending Americans be taken care of before the 
presidential party or accompanying newsmen left the country. To satisfy these 
arrangements, a government spokesman announced a State Department official would 
be serving as a bagman, carrying “$6-million in cash to China to cover the anticipated 
costs of the trip.”22 Obviously worried about justifying the $1 million adventure his 
group planned, Salant at CBS remarked if it all amounted “‘to nothing but people 
getting in and out of cars, it won’t be worth it…but we have to take the chance. This 
is one very grand, very remote and very expensive stake-out.’”23  
Aside from such monetary considerations, possible technical difficulties also 
caused concerns, because sending the crews’ live reports over such great distances 
certainly opened the door to a myriad of possible transmission problems. As only five 
telephone lines then connected the P.R.C. to the outside world, Ziegler informed 
network representatives “that the Chinese had agreed to install a ground station in 
Peking for satellite transmission of Teletype messages, wire photos, voice broadcasts 
and live color TV”; company executives welcomed this information, because then, 
like the actors on the popular science fiction show Star Trek, their top anchors could 
be beamed directly into America’s cozy living rooms from their field positions in 
wintry Beijing.24 Recognizing the selected news personnel’s arrival date as February 
20, the day before President Nixon’s scheduled landing, Ziegler promised “interviews 
with Chinese, tours of schools and communes, comfortable hotel rooms and 
invitations to state banquets—a rosy picture for the few fortunate enough to make the 
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trip.”25 While also explaining the Chinese planned no censorship of the Americans’ 
collective works, he further noted the journalists’ abilities to conduct man-on-the-
street interviews if they wished; in reality, the language barrier for many of the 
chosen television personalities greatly diminished the value of this particular 
freedom.26 Regardless of the eventual results achieved by the various news outlets’ 
representatives, everyone involved realized “Nixon’s visit at least opened a chink in 
Mao’s Bamboo Curtain.”27 
After having their names culled from the initial group of 2,000, the media 
personnel chosen had been extremely fortunate. Now, they all just needed to learn 
more about their mysterious destination. Max Frankel, Washington bureau chief for 
The New York Times freely confessed, “‘I know nothing about China…. I can’t even 
keep the names straight. How to prepare for what we’ll see is a complete 
bafflement.’”28 These singularly frank remarks summed up the frightening reality for 
many inside Washington in the weeks prior to Nixon’s flight. According to Frankel, 
the P.R.C. was considered “virgin territory as far as reporting is concerned. Every 
time you turn around there’s something fresh and different and new.”29 While Helen 
Thomas noticed “some of her colleagues gave up drinking and immersed themselves 
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in books and papers on China,” she also mentioned, “‘this is the first time I’ve seen 
correspondents hit the books.’”30 
Reflecting this sudden flurry of activity, while Columbia University’s 
Professor Donald Klein admitted he personally gave at least thirty journalists private 
briefings on Chinese history and culture, local library workers also reported many 
eager patrons scouring the shelves for any items concerning that country. Once the 
media personnel learned more about Beijing’s weather, others hurriedly invested in 
heavy winter wear.31 While ABC executives provided Tom Jarriel and his entire crew 
with “elaborate winter-weather gear, including down-filled ski jackets, water-proof 
boots and bandit-style stocking masks,” and NBC’s Barbara Walters decided to 
include several lengthy skirts in her ensemble, author Theodore White, who thought 
such frantic fussing over incidentals pure silliness, commented, “‘All we’ll need is a 
toothbrush, a razor and some long underwear…. Peking in the wintertime is no worse 
than New Hampshire at primary time.’”32 
While the media crews prepared to face their various assignment duties, they 
still wondered about a precise agenda. Jack Otter, head of sales for NBC, stated his 
reporters would be covering the presidential couple’s arrival in the Chinese capital, 
but he could only speculate on when, or even if, the American public might be treated 
to televised images of famous sites, such as the Forbidden City or the Great Wall.33 
Because the administration had provided no prior information about either the 
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Nixons’ accommodations or the locations for the planned negotiation sessions, the 
press corps could only look at their flight schedules and ponder an achievable 
shooting schedule. The official itinerary showed that after the President and First 
Lady departed Washington, D. C. on the morning of February 17, they would then 
experience stopovers in Hawaii, Guam, and Shanghai, where they would refuel, pick 
up a Chinese navigator, an interpreter, and an additional radio operator, before 
completing the last 710 miles to the Beijing airport.34 
Members of the national press speculated for weeks about Nixon’s reception 
in Beijing. With his trip deemed an official state visit, programmers thought the 
president would receive the Chinese welcome usually extended to heads of state; 
because this naturally implied considerable pomp and circumstance, they expected to 
capture footage of him descending the plane’s steps to the cacophonous sounds of 
crashing cymbals, gongs, and drums.35 In hindsight, these assumptions about the 
initial Chinese welcome are interesting, as no established diplomatic relations existed 
at that time between the U.S. and the P.R.C. Having also been informed the Chinese 
Premier would attend the President’s arrival ceremony, network personnel believed 
that, after Nixon and Zhou had officially greeted one another, the entire group would 
then most probably drive past the Gate of Heavenly Peace, the site where Mao had 
proclaimed the P.R.C.’s birth in 1949.36 The Nixons were scheduled to spend several 
days in Beijing, and then another in Hangchow, due to that ancient city’s historical 
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significance.37 After a day of sightseeing, the Nixons would then depart on February 
27 from Shanghai and head, via an Alaskan route, back to Washington, D. C.38 By 
utilizing their most experienced anchors for the story, the networks fervently hoped to 
provide an unforgettable media experience for their viewers.39 This planned journey 
had already been deemed “one of the most daring diplomatic exploits of modern 
times.”40 While some of those fastidiously planning this entire affair initially 
expressed great optimism at its outcome, China had been considered an ideologically 
estranged enemy for over two decades. “‘I understand the Chinese people regard us as 
Martians,’ mused NBC’s John Chancellor. ‘Just wait until they see all those 
journalists with all those lights and cameras staggering off the plane.’”41  
For an occasion of such world import, each of the major networks sent their 
“biggest guns in news”; ABC chose Harry Reasoner, CBS sent the powerful duo of 
Cronkite and Eric Sevareid, while NBC executives decided on Chancellor and 
Walters.42 Fully intending to furnish “a half-hour nightly summary of each day’s 
events” for the American public to digest with their dinners, programmers also 
realized that any prior notice about the daily montage beaming via the new Intelsat IV 
satellite, a $19.5 million cylinder launched into space the month before, depended 
upon whether the Chinese provided media representatives with an advance agenda, 
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and whether the television personnel themselves experienced any significant technical 
difficulties.43 Crews carefully packed over 100 videotape reels, and planned to 
process any captured footage through the newly constructed twenty-ton broadcast 
facility located at Beijing airport, where approximately forty tons of electronic 
equipment and seventy-three U.S. technicians would already be awaiting their arrival; 
network executives had an option to utilize all this new technology for exclusive 
reports by their particular anchors, but they understood each hour would cost them 
$8,300.44 
Over “one hundred reporters, news executives, and cameramen and other 
technicians” were eventually handpicked to attend; while “seven pool correspondents 
and photographers” would be flying with the president on Air Force One, “a full 
press plane, a Pan American Airways charter, was ahead, scheduled to land first, as 
always, to witness presidential landings.”45 The Today show’s Walters expressed 
some annoyance at her place aboard the so-called Zoo Plane, which carried all the 
technicians and photographers.46 While in transit, “the journalists practiced using 
chopsticks…[and] played cards for the Chinese currency they had been issued,” 
before they disembarked on January 20 at the Beijing airport; their Chinese hosts 
treated the tired correspondents to a welcoming reception in the Palace of 
Nationalities. The press corps, “housed near Tiananmen Square, in the cavernous 
Soviet-style Minzu Hotel,” received a friendly greeting from You Zhong-jing, who 
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provided them with details concerning their accommodation’s amenities.47 Inside 
their rooms, the Americans discovered “candy, fruit, tea, and stamps had been laid 
out,” but their toilets featured freshly lacquered wooden toilet seats; “unfortunately, 
the extract of sumac in the lacquer caused painful boils on those who were allergic to 
it. The advance party had already encountered what they’d nicknamed ‘baboon 
bottom.’”48  
While the new Beijing media facilities featured twenty-two tables with forty-
four microphones, an additional twenty-five telephone and teleprinter channels also 
stood available for their use; their Chinese hosts informed them they might also freely 
enjoy the ten provided broadcast booths, but if they wished to use the pressroom, they 
were respectfully asked to first discuss this with “the information office of the foreign 
ministry.”49 Reporters soon discovered that although the press center came “equipped 
with a basketball court, a bowling alley and dozens of pigtailed waitresses dispensing 
cups of green tea,” the P.R.C.’s media personnel were generally unprepared to “get 
stories out fast,” and lacked the capability to either ship “film quickly out of the 
country” or to “transmit to satellites”; the senior Chinese journalist at the time later 
expressed his great astonishment at the speed with which the foreigners worked, and 
once these guests realized the Chinese fascination with their Xerox copier, because 
their hosts routinely copied every document by hand, the Americans arranged to leave 
their machine in the country after they departed.50 
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The television crewmembers then prepared themselves to follow Nixon’s 
every move during his stay in China. Because the networks planned to beam the 
ceremonial festivities live via satellite to a worldwide audience, they realized they 
had the unprecedented opportunity to reach approximately 600 million viewers.51 The 
trip’s official agenda listed Beijing’s Great Hall of the People as the location for two 
state dinners, with the one hosted by the U.S. featuring American champagne and 
cigarettes.52 Although they understood the Premier would conduct the summit’s daily 
work sessions, speculators also expected the president to meet the Chairman and 
attend other social events. Unfortunately for interested viewers, “not a single network 
seat on the press planes [had gone] to a specialist in Chinese languages or Chinese 
culture.”53 Despite this, according to press releases of February 1972, President Nixon 
scored a personal triumph that week in the P.R.C. He not only knew about, and took 
full advantage of “all the television camera positions on the Great Wall,” but he even 
quoted from “Mao Tse-tung’s poetry at the opening banquet and greeted Chou before 
one [plenary] session with a lusty Ni hau (‘How are you?’).”54  
On the eve of his departure from Washington, D. C., Nixon’s political critics 
and rivals still pondered his ultimate intentions.55 While some of his detractors 
described the event as merely a politically motivated “visit-to-Peking ploy,” they also 
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faced the stark truth that the president had “recaptured the propaganda initiative.”56 
Even if it were, as some surmised, just an election-year stunt, they were dependent 
upon the press to provide fair coverage; as an article in Newsweek pointed out, Nixon 
would receive a media-driven head start at precisely the moment his 1972 re-election 
campaign slipped into gear.57 Nixon had actually “invested immense political capital 
in achieving something of substance in Peking.”58 No politician with any experience 
at all would have turned down such an alluring opportunity for personal exposure. For 
the moment, whether his opponents liked it or not, Nixon had stolen their collective 
thunder by traveling to Beijing. 
As this important event occurred under a president known for heartily desiring 
ample space and privacy, one might justifiably question just how journalists had ever 
succeeded in adequately covering his visit. Their job had certainly not been simple. 
Before Nixon’s arrival, an advance group of twenty-five media representatives had 
“set up a satellite ground station at Peking airport”; however, upon their return to the 
states, they released few details about what they saw or planned to do in the future.59 
“‘The lid’s still on,’ demurred one network spokesman. ‘We’re kind of wrapped up,’ 
explained a TV technician.’”60 Despite their secrecy, once Nixon’s plane landed, 
Western audiences watched the extended broadcasts, remaining “fascinated by the 
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spectacle of America’s staunchly anti-Communist president fraternizing behind the 
Bamboo Curtain.”61 As Russell Baker, of The New York Times, commented: 
We already knew that a President could make it very difficult for 
anyone else to get attention on television…but until the Peking trip we 
did not realize that he had the power to pack the entire television 
industry into an airplane and transport it lock, stock and Sevareid out 
of the country.62 
During the Nixons’ stay, the large press contingency shadowed their every 
move, but many Americans soon believed themselves short-changed. Even though the 
journey to the P.R.C. surely marked an important turning point in world history, some 
citizens thought the national media’s coverage lacked credibility and substance, 
because the best explanations of details in the captured footage often came from 
Sinologists sitting in New York studios. Those watching from home quickly realized 
most of the anchors reporting the breaking news possessed little working knowledge 
about either the ancient nation’s history or its colorful customs. Although Nixon and 
Kissinger had laboriously prepared for the summit meetings, media cultural 
preparedness had been virtually ignored. Viewers were not alone in sensing 
something amiss. In fact, once their crews landed on the ground inside China, 
network representatives also began expressing dissatisfaction with the 
administration’s finalized arrangements. Enduring extremely long working hours, 
these professionals soon vented their own frustrations about the difficulties in 
successfully following Nixon’s movements. 
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On February 21, 1972, when President Nixon began his 11,510-mile odyssey, 
those following the story in Washington noted the president’s personal exhilaration; 
the American leader laughed easily and poked officials good-naturedly in their ribs 
before boarding his helicopter.63 He addressed an 8,000-member audience, carefully 
describing his important current mission for peace and fellowship to China, and told 
his listeners that although many political differences existed between the U.S. and the 
P.R.C., “what we must do is to find a way to see that we can have differences without 
being enemies in war.”64 As far as achieving peace in his own country, President 
Nixon experienced some success, because “even the Democrats in Congress signed a 
unanimous resolution wishing him well.”65 
Following the formal ceremonies, Nixon “seemed to be in great spirits on the 
chopper going over to Andrews [Air Force Base],” believing “the whole thing had 
gone well.”66 This, however, did not mean his critics had nothing further to say. In 
what some perceived as “partisan craftiness–or recklessness–the Democratic National 
Committee’s weekly newsletter suggested that Nixon may be planning another 
smashing surprise by settling the Viet Nam War while he is in Peking”; they 
“envisioned ‘a secret summit of leaders from the Asian Communist nations’ meeting 
with Nixon.”67 On the other side of the aisle, some Republicans thought “the 
Democrats seemed to be building up expectations, presumably hoping to benefit from 
                                                 
63 Reeves, President Nixon, 432; “Now, in Living Color from China,” Time, February 28, 1972, 11.  
 
64 Ibid.; Richard H. Rovere, “Letter from Washington: February 27, 1972,” The New Yorker, March 4, 
1972, 105. 
 
65 “To the Summit in Peking,” Newsweek, February 28, 1972, 12. 
 
66 Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries, entry dated Thursday, February 17, 1972, 411. 
 
67 “Now, in Living Color from China,” Time, February 28, 1972, 12. 
 73
the disappointment if no such settlement occurs.”68 Though some Nixon detractors, 
such as George Ball, may have criticized the President for the way he approached the 
Chinese summit talks, one writer for Newsweek emphatically stated, “at this historic 
juncture, all the hoopla, ceremony and television coverage were perhaps necessary to 
symbolize the staggering dimensions of the task and the equally significant stakes.”69 
  Once underway, the president “knew he was taking a big risk. If the trip 
failed, he could be blamed for making a colossal blunder.”70 He believed, however, a 
warm welcome by millions of Chinese would be “worth a hundred times the effect of 
the communiqué,” and that he “must have some chance for pictures with the people”; 
toward this end, Mrs. Nixon accompanied him on his journey. Emphasizing “the need 
for close discipline on the press during the week,” Nixon also wanted to make 
absolutely sure everyone understood they were not “to talk to the press”; that was, as 
Haldeman remembered, “unless we decide to do so, that we’ve got to create the 
impression that this is a very tough bargaining session, not all peaches and cream.”71 
The president’s plane landed “in Shanghai to board Chinese navigators” before then 
“heading toward Peking’s Capital Airport”; at the P.R.C’s absolute insistence, these 
pilots flew the Air Force 707 for the last segment of Nixon’s flight into Beijing, but 
because the men “could not understand the American airliner’s navigation system, 
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[they utilized their] eyesight and hand signals instead.”72 As the aircraft made its final 
approach, a U.S. agent contacted a security officer on the ground, requesting an 
update on the crowds below. When he received the reply that no spectators had 
gathered, the Secret Service man radioed again, but received the same answer.73 
Despite the seeming insincerity of his remarks, Press Secretary Ziegler later said the 
official welcome had been “exactly what we expected.”74  
The networks had their personnel in place to provide live coverage of the 
important presidential arrival.75 When Kissinger traveled to the P.R.C. the previous 
fall, he had warned his hosts “that the requirements of a presidential visit would… 
require ‘several battalions’ of technical people.”76 While the Chinese expected an 
advance media team, the amount of planning amazed them; “the Americans worked 
out the best place for Nixon’s plane to land so that it would stop at the right distance 
and angle for good shots of his descent toward the reception party. The runway was 
measured and marked up with paint.”77  
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That Monday, the surrounding airport buildings were quiet, and the 
temperature stood at thirty-four degrees.78 Classifying the welcome as eerie, one 
American reporter noted the following: no onlookers had been allowed to attend the 
plane’s arrival, the Chinese greeters, which included “Zhou Enlai, two dozen officials 
and some of their assistants, a 350-man honor guard, and an army band that played 
the national anthems,” had marched onto the field only moments before the landing, 
and the U.S. and Chinese flags flew on two flagpoles, while fifteen other poles stood 
bare.79 After the president’s plane taxied to a stop, and his jet’s door had opened, he 
stepped out into the bitter cold morning air. He had finally arrived in the P.R.C. With 
Patricia at his side, a woman he referred to as “a superb goodwill ambassador,” “the 
most widely traveled First Lady,” and someone who “deeply believed in the 
importance of personal diplomacy,” he was ready to begin his new adventure.80 
Although she had been informed only Chinese prostitutes routinely wore the color, 
Mrs. Nixon insisted on wearing her red coat for the occasion.81 Below the couple on 
the tarmac, the Chinese Premier, attired in a dark suit and grey overcoat, stood 
waiting, unsmilingly accompanied by seventeen senior officials and twenty-five 
additional junior party dignitaries.82 From their positions thirty yards away, media 
personnel soon overheard the President greet his Chinese hosts.83 The grand send-off 
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the Nixons had experienced in America contrasted sharply with this quiet ceremony, 
as no gongs rang out happy greetings, nor did any Chinese children present the First 
Lady with flowers.84  From the CBS studios in New York, Charles Collingwood 
asked his colleague, “‘Is there an air of excitement in Peking today?’ No, Walter 
Cronkite couldn’t say there was”; appearing before NBC’s cameras, Barbara Walters 
reported an “air of disappointment,” at the lack of “cymbal players to greet President 
Nixon.”85 Marching past the honor guard, the dignitaries departed the airport in black 
limousines and green sedans, thus ending a mere five minutes of ceremony before the 
American viewing public watched President and Mrs. Nixon disappear into the heart 
of China.86  
The journalists on site failed to realize, however, that small, subtle gestures, 
such as the presence of an honor guard, which had been discontinued for several 
years, and an appearance by almost all of the P.R.C.’s party leaders, both symbolized 
extensions of respect by Chairman Mao.87 In an article appearing in Newsweek, 
Sydney Liu stated, “to a China watcher like myself, the airport reception seemed 
downright friendly”; he pointed out while the couple’s welcome upon their “arrival in 
Peking…must have seemed frosty indeed,” it was actually quite warm, once one 
considered that during the previous year, the Beijing leadership had called Nixon “the 
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most ferocious and cruel chieftain of imperialism.”88 While it remained common 
knowledge that thousands greeted the rulers of Ethiopia and Romania when they 
visited the P.R.C., interpreters carefully explained to the foreign reporters that the 
kind of welcome extended to the Nixons had been extremely “proper, polite and 
appropriate––all they said, that the chief of a government that didn’t recognize the 
People’s Republic could expect.”89  
When Nixon and Zhou met that day on the tarmac, they shook hands. As the 
former president recalled: 
As I came down the ramp, Zhou began to applaud. I returned the 
gesture, and then, as I reached the bottom step, I stretched out my hand 
to Zhou. When he took it, it was more than a handshake. We both 
knew that it marked a turning point in history.90 
Though many viewers may have considered this act merely a mundane courtesy, it 
actually meant a great deal to the Premier. At the 1954 Geneva Conference, the U.S. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had deeply offended Zhou by refusing to shake 
his hand.91 Now in 1972, the Premier told Nixon, “Your handshake came over the 
vastest ocean in the world––twenty-five years of no communication.”92 After seven 
long months of national anticipation, “the doors had swung open on a new policy of 
dialogue between China and the U.S.”93 
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The New York Times ran a banner announcing: “Nixon Arrives In Peking To 
Begin An 8-Day Visit; Met By Chou At Airport,” and Max Frankel’s report, “A Quiet 
Greeting,” notified readers that the president’s presence in the communists’ capital 
not only marked “the end of a generation of hostility between the United States and 
China,” but also the beginning of “a new and still undefined relationship between the 
most powerful and the most populous of nations.”94 President Nixon had arrived in 
Mao’s country, but he also later reflected in his memoirs, “it was an eerie ride from 
the airport to the government guest house in Beijing,” as he “could see that except for 
a lonely sentry stationed every few hundred yards, the streets were totally deserted.”95 
The Russian-made Zil limousines drove fifteen miles to reach the city, and the 
foreigners noticed on “each block there might be one person on a bicycle and a family 
walking along, but not one looked up and some of the Americans guessed, correctly, 
that they were props, actors.”96 Howard Tuckner, an ABC News correspondent, 
witnessed the procession from inside Tiananmen Square. He reported: 
Foreign diplomats here who watched with us told us that the Chinese 
leadership has orchestrated the size of crowds to indicate their attitudes 
towards heads of state…since the Chinese have no formal relationship 
with the United States, the Chinese must have decided to turn out no 
crowd at all rather than one too small or too large.97 
Before the motorcade entered the area, an interpreter had already informed Tuckner, 
“this was an ordinary day here, nothing special, that it was not a holiday”; therefore, 
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as Nixon passed, “there was no cheering, no waving, no emotion. Hardly a head 
turned.”98 The guests had just arrived at their accommodations, located on Beijing’s 
western outskirts near the Jade Abyss Pool, when the telephone rang; a polite voice 
stated, “Chairman Mao Tse-tung…would be pleased to receive the President of the 
U.S. at his residence, at Mr. Nixon’s convenience.”99 This was highly unusual, as 
Mao usually saw dignitaries only at the conclusions of their stays in his country; 
therefore, while the American newscasters “huddled on the steps of the Great Hall of 
the People in the late afternoon cold, a surrealistic tableau of the press in search of a 
President,” Nixon unexpectedly met with the mysterious Chinese leader in his warm 
and cozy personal study.100 The Chairman’s invitation had surprised the president, yet 
their speaking so soon signaled “to the people of China that the anti-American signs 
which still graced the walls on Tien an men Square no longer meant much.”101 Nixon 
also quickly realized his cool reception at the airport would not set the tone for his 
entire visit, as “in the inner councils of the Chinese leadership a decision had been 
reached to throw the full weight of the official Government, party and army behind 
the arduous negotiations with the U.S.”102 That afternoon, “in his yellow-roofed and 
modest home in a corner of the old Forbidden City,” when the “rotund and 
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jovial…the great revolutionary” welcomed him, Nixon finally came face to face with 
Mao Zedong.103 
For his meeting with the American leader, “Mao put on a new suit and a new 
pair of shoes. His hair was freshly cut and his face cleanly shaved.”104 Nixon later 
recalled in his memoirs that when the two men greeted each other, Mao had 
“stretched out his hand. So did I. He shook my hand for as long as about one 
minute.”105 Nixon had also noticed the Chairman’s office had been “cluttered with 
books––not for show, but for reading,” and that his skin had “no wrinkles, but its 
sallowness made it seem almost waxen.”106 Although “enfeebled by age and ill 
health,” Mao’s mind, the former president later wrote, “was sharp…there was no 
question that he was in command on the Chinese side”; definitely “taking my 
measure, as I was taking his,” Nixon remarked, “he was trying to discern whether 
American affluence had made us soft and whether our troubles in Vietnam had 
sapped our strength of will.”107 Despite the Chairman’s obvious health issues, Nixon 
also reported the Chinese leader “was still treated with enormous respect by his aides 
and attendants and was sharp in his repartee.”108  
                                                 
103 “Nixon’s Great Leap into China,” Life, March 3, 1972, 4; John Osborne, “Mission to China,” The 
New Republic, March 4, 1972, 9. 
 
104 He Di, “The Most Respected Enemy: Mao Zedong’s Perception of the United States,” The China 
Quarterly, no. 137 (March 1994): 144. 
 
105 Nixon, RN, 557-58, 560. 
 
106 Nixon, In the Arena, 13; Nixon, Leaders, 238. 
 
107 Nixon, The Real War, 133. 
 
108 Nixon, In the Arena, 13, 360. 
 
 81
While presenting “his visitors with inscribed copies of his collected poems, 
Mao affected the posture of father of his country,” and in answer to the American 
leader’s comment that his works had “moved a nation and changed the world,” he 
simply responded, “I haven’t been able to change it. I’ve only been able to change a 
few places in the vicinity of Peking.”109 Mao had also insisted, “I discuss the 
philosophical questions.”110 As he talked with Nixon, Mao realized “just how 
friendless and vulnerable China was in the world, in part because of his own 
disastrous policies,” but the man sitting across from him was also “well aware of the 
damage that the Vietnam War had done at home and abroad.”111 Because Nixon 
needed “to deliver on his campaign promise to end the Vietnam War and with Mao 
fearful of the militarily superior Soviet Union, each leader could offer something the 
other needed.”112 During their short talk, Mao, smiling broadly, told Nixon, “I voted 
for you during your last elections,” and that he liked “rightists…I am comparatively 
happy when these people on the right come into power”; to this, Nixon responded, “I 
think the most important thing to note is that in America, at least at this time, those on 
the right can do what those on the left can only talk about.”113 As the two men parted, 
Nixon told Mao that, although they had both started their lives from humble origins, 
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they had now become leaders of powerful nations.114 This historic meeting had been 
scheduled to last fifteen minutes, but ended after a full hour; the Chairman had 
become “thoroughly captivated by the discussion,” and Nixon remembered noticing 
that “Zhou glanced at his watch with increasing frequency as Mao began to tire.”115  
Because the networks had planned to cover Nixon’s movements that day, the 
press pool had traveled to the guesthouse; however, as the scheduled plenary session, 
originally set to begin at 4:30 that afternoon had been delayed, Haldeman wrote, “We 
just kept the press waiting, saying the thing had been postponed”; as for Nixon, he 
“was especially pleased that the Chinese film cameras had managed to cover” his 
meeting with Mao, and “had agreed to make the film and their still photos 
available.”116 For those who had wondered just how secretive Nixon would remain 
while in the P.R.C., they received an answer that first afternoon. As ABC 
correspondent Tom Jarriel reported, “The first talks with Mao seemed to fall into the 
category described by the President when he recently said, ‘there will be considerable 
discussion not necessarily made public, but useful in exploring the common 
ground.’”117 The American reporters had not been happy with Ziegler, when he 
deflected questions about the surprise meeting by stating, “The President and 
Chairman Mao met this afternoon for one hour.”118  
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As far as diplomatic matters between Nixon and Zhou were concerned, their 
first meeting went well.119 General Ye Jian-ying attended many of the top-level 
discussions; his presence signified that publicly “the Chinese Army…[was] squarely 
on the side of the effort by the two countries to reach an accommodation.”120 Charles 
Freeman’s “ability to read Chinese upside down made him useful on the American 
side of the negotiating table,” and another person who became “familiar to millions of 
American television viewers” during that long week of negotiations was translator 
Nancy Tang, “a slim, bespectacled young Chinese woman [who] was present to help 
them bridge the language gap.”121 
That evening, one reporter noted, “I could feel the change in atmosphere that 
same night at Chou En-lai’s state dinner for Mr. Nixon.”122 The entire affair “was 
very impressive and quite overwhelming, even to the cynical members of the press 
corps.”123 The foreign guests “made their way up a grand staircase for photographs, 
[and] then were ushered into a somber hall filled with round tables and decorated with 
Chinese and American flags”; while the Beijing revolutionary committee’s 
representatives came that evening, no members of the Chinese radical faction 
attended.124 The President, First Lady, and other top administration officials “sat with 
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Zhou Enlai at a table for 20; everyone else was at tables of ten. Each person had an 
ivory place card embossed in gold English and Chinese characters and chopsticks 
engraved with his or her name”; polite dinner conversation was accomplished with 
interpreter assistance.125 Waiters delivered a bountiful meal, and when Nixon 
complimented the Premier on the beauty of the PLA band’s rendition of America the 
Beautiful, he “murmured, ‘that was the song they played at your inaugural. I thought 
you would like it for tonight.’”126 The musical selections proved interesting to China 
watchers, as all so-called bourgeois, or decadent, music had been banned in recent 
years.127 As the “lazy Susans spun, laden with duck slices with pineapple, three-
colored eggs, carp, chicken, prawns, shark fin, dumplings, sweet rice cake, fried rice, 
and in a nod toward Western tastes, bread and butter,” each person present also “had 
three glasses: one for water or orange juice, one for wine, [and] one for China’s 
famous Mao-tai–‘white lightning’ to American journalists or, as CBS’s Dan Rather 
put it, ‘liquid razor blades.’”128 The Mao-tai, which enjoyed purity protection from 
the Premier, because “all industry was banned from 100 kilometers upstream of the 
river used” in its production by Kweichow Moutai, had an “alcohol level of more 
than 50 percent,” and it “had been famous since the San Francisco World’s Fair of 
1915”; the Premier, who was known as the “‘father of Maotai’ for his support of the 
company,” told Nixon the drink had been used for medicinal purposes during the 
Long March, even taking “a match to his cup, saying, ‘Mr. Nixon, please take a look. 
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It can indeed catch fire.’”129 Voicing his hopes for a successful week, the Premier also 
remarked, “We hope that through a frank exchange of views between our two sides to 
gain a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts to find common ground, a 
new start can be made in the relations between our two countries”; in his own speech 
that evening, Nixon replied to such sentiments by stating, “What brings us together is 
that we have common interests, which transcend those differences.”130 
At that first banquet, “the two former enemies celebrated a new relationship 
and the American networks covered it live for four hours.”131 After anchor Howard 
K. Smith told his viewing audience, “A new page in history was written today in 
Peking. And my colleague Harry Reasoner is there,” Reasoner, reporting on “Richard 
Nixon and Chou En-lai ‘both contending that the world can change and should,’” also 
stated, “‘No one had expected that much candor, and that much warmth…from a 
leader whose party is not all that committed to friendship with America.’”132 Smith 
further remarked, “‘A year ago, the possibility that we’d ever see anything like this 
picture seemed more remote than Neil Armstrong’s first footstep on the moon.’”133 
Recording the evening’s highlights “from their tables at the far end of the hall,” the 
American journalists “stood on chairs and used field glasses to see the historic scene. 
Nixon had wanted them there, just as he had wanted live television coverage, because 
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he understood their power.”134 While John Holdridge, who later recalled, “‘the 
atmosphere in the Great Hall was electric,’” soon found himself “playing an old 
drinking game of counting fingers” with the Chinese minister of electric power, in 
which the “loser had to drain his glass to a shout of ‘Ganbei!’” not all of those present 
were so enamored with the glitzy proceedings. Haldeman, a teetotaler, thought 
himself quite out of place that evening, and the more cynical William F. Buckley later 
wrote the spectacle “was if Sir Hartley Shawcross had suddenly risen from the 
prosecutor’s stand at Nuremberg and descended to embrace Goering and Goebbels 
and Doenitz and Hess, begging them to join with him in the making of a better 
world.”135 Standing alongside “Teddy White and…Buckley at the back of Beijing’s 
Great Hall of the People as Nixon drank champagne with Zhou Enlai,” Hugh Sidey 
recalled, “No moment in my judgment…has been as significant.’”136 While the 
evening seemed to go well, the correspondents wondered just how many of the 
auspicious occasion’s details would reach the P.R.C.’s general population via the 
nationally controlled media.137 After the last course, according to Chinese tradition, 
the banquet abruptly ended, the “guests hurried to the cars, and journalists rushed to 
file their stories,” but one lucky Canadian journalist named John Burns left the event 
with “Nixon’s chopsticks as a souvenir. Although a New York dealer sent a cable 
with an offer of $10,000, Burns kept them.”138 
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Later that night, when Nixon expressed concern over how the day’s media 
coverage may have played with American audiences, Haldeman reported it “had been 
extremely good, and he [Nixon] was very pleased with that”; also noting since he had 
received word “the networks handled it exactly the way the P [Nixon] wanted,” 
Haldeman believed “there was no need for us to put out any further line.”139 Of 
course, because the event had been scripted to impress adults, the spectacular’s 
political fine points were lost on certain American viewers. One citizen of Bay City, 
Texas, recalled her experience while watching the broadcasts with her family. “The 
president looked so different next to the Chinese…big teeth, big nose, big ears...and 
he constantly had a big smile on his face,” she remembered, before then adding, “and 
Pat always looked so pretty.”140 Oblivious to such domestic perceptions, Haldeman’s 
diary entry the following day once again commented on the “almost euphoric 
reporting of the banquet…[noting it had been] very impressive.”141 Having “scripted 
the China trip down to the last camera angle,” he now began to sense that his efforts 
were, “from a public-relations point of view, a success.”142 
The next day, while her husband met with the Premier, Mrs. Nixon “visited 
the kitchen of the Peking Hotel,” before then spending the afternoon exploring the 
Summer Palace and Beijing Zoo, where she viewed the pandas.143 That evening, she 
traveled via motorcade with her husband to the Great Hall of the People, where the 
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couple then joined the Chairman’s wife, Jiang Qing, at a ballet performance of The 
Red Detachment of Women.144 While the Premier may have been described as Mao’s 
constant political partner and faithful comrade, “Madame Mao, Jiang Qing, Mao’s 
fourth wife,” had been described as “his attack dog.”145 There had been some internal 
disagreement about the wisdom of inviting Nixon to the P.R.C. While Madame Mao 
believed “China’s U.S. policy was both unnecessary and too conciliatory,” she also 
insisted “although we do not have ‘white friends,’ ‘big friends’ and ‘wealthy friends,’ 
we are not isolated.”146 Her position by marriage caused people to kowtow “before 
her—not because they respected or liked her or even wanted to serve her but because 
she was the Chairman’s wife.”147 Despite her attitude about politics, the Nixons 
enjoyed themselves at the provided entertainment, but according to Haldeman, the 
ballet “was just as we had been led to believe, a complete propaganda operation.”148 
As the American reporters had followed Mrs. Nixon that day, they also 
noticed, with some surprise, how the Chinese had definitely awakened to their 
leaders’ enthusiasm regarding the president’s visit. Like the Americans, many 
members of the Chinese media covered the week’s events, and quite adeptly used 
their own domestic press to alert citizens to the country’s shift in foreign policy.149 
Even those in the smallest villages heard announcements discussing the historic 
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meeting, as people gathered before loudspeakers and radios to hear the reports.150 
Hsinhua, the P.R.C’s official press agency, sent dispatches to publications across the 
country, while the People’s Daily, Beijing’s paper, splashed information and 
photographs of the previous day’s activities across two of its four pages.151 The 
People’s Daily printed that the presidential visit “had the total blessing of Chairman 
Mao and that they should expect good and great things for the People’s Republic to 
flow from it.”152 This press coverage was extraordinary, as not even Khrushchev had 
garnered such attention.153 “You have an extensive press in China. You have also the 
radio in China,” an article in U.S. News & World Report had cautioned its readers. 
“Don’t forget that they have the radio in every single village of China. And they will 
be presenting the arrival of the President as a victory for China.”154  
Evidently, prior to Nixon’s visit, “Chinese curiosity about America was far 
less than American curiosity about China.”155 While he toured the country, U.S. News 
& World Report’s Robert Martin discovered “there had been no great previous debate 
in China on President Nixon’s trip,” but the various “Chinese officials and newsmen, 
who were essentially employees of the government,” he spoke with “seemed to be 
seized by the idea that the United States alone was at fault for years of conflict and 
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confrontation.”156 Since the P.R.C.’s creation in 1949, it had remained a well-known 
fact that public media sources, such as the People’s Daily, commonly portrayed “the 
U.S. as the chief enemy of all Chinese and Third World people,” and often provided 
readers with descriptions of America as “a land of sharp class antagonisms, 
decadence and in the throes of a proletarian revolution.”157 Although overtly negative 
views about America may have been somewhat temporarily suppressed in preparation 
for Nixon’s historic visit, such ideas still graced local newspapers. As a writer for 
Newsweek noted upon the president’s return to America: 
While Peking’s propagandists have not recently used some of their 
more vicious epithets for Mr. Nixon–‘god of plague,’ for example, has 
temporarily gone out of use–the official press agency, Hsinhua, last 
week charged again that ‘the foreign policy of U.S. imperialism 
remains one of global aggression and power politics.’158  
Mrs. Nixon remained ignorant of any overt animosity as she continued her 
sightseeing tour of the P.R.C. on Wednesday, February 23, 1972. While Nixon and 
Zhou met at the guest house that afternoon to conduct their discussions, the First 
Lady “visited the Evergreen People’s Commune on the west edge of Peking,” and 
also “talked with workers making glass flowers and animals” at the Beijing 
Glassware Factory.159 That evening, the Nixons watched a “public exhibition of 
gymnastics, badminton, and table tennis at the Capital Gymnasium”; over 20,000 
people attended that performance.160 It soon became clear that the Nixon 
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administration was not the only governmental entity participating in activities to 
further their cause through public relations efforts. While the event’s seating “had 
been by areas of persons dressed in similar uniforms or sweat suits,” the lighting 
system in the facility enabled the Chinese hosts “to turn on sections of overhead lights 
for the television cameras, and as each section was lighted from time to time, the 
people in it would all automatically start cheering for the camera.”161  
As the weekdays passed, and the initial excitement wore down, diplomatic 
progress continued to develop in a positive manner. The American media personnel, 
however, also began to become frustrated over the secrecy surrounding Nixon’s work 
in the P.R.C., after they heard Ronald Ziegler announce, “I’m not prepared to give 
you any information about the meetings at this time.”162 The Nixon administration 
also faced some criticism after Americans noticed that Secretary of State Rogers had 
“accompanied the President, but…his role was smaller by far than that of Henry 
Kissinger”; Rogers had not been “involved in any of the important meetings, and was 
being kept out of things,” which led, according to Haldeman, to his being “obviously 
uptight” and making “the point that if there’s any other meeting with Mao, he wanted 
to be sure that he is included.”163 Despite these sorts of internal administrative 
troubles, the afternoon’s political sessions went well. 
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That important week in China, “attention to detail and symbolism were 
hallmarks of Nixon’s visit for both the Chinese and the Americans.”164 The networks 
continued their coverage of the event, as “a gaggle of U.S. reporters followed Nixon 
to scenic spots and his meeting with China’s happy workers and smiling 
schoolchildren.”165 On February 24, “a bright, sunny, 20-degrees” Thursday, the 
Nixons made the forty-mile trip to see the tombs of the Ming Dynasty’s Emperors, 
before then also touring the Great Wall of China.166 At their first destination, the 
couple witnessed “children, with touches of rouge on their faces, skipping; families 
dressed in bright new clothes having picnics and listening to revolutionary songs on 
their transistor radios; groups of friends playing cards, apparently oblivious to the 
bitter cold.”167 That morning, the press “got their first exclusives by figuring out that 
the families and children posing for pictures with the President-along with everyone 
else at the tombs-were props bused in by local revolutionary committees”; as Ted 
Koppel later remembered: 
I told my camera crew that we were going to wait until all the other 
Americans had left. And sure enough, a couple of open trucks pulled 
up. Someone collected all the radios and cameras, and the cast of the 
Potemkin village that had been assembled for us was trucked off.168 
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Oblivious to what had just been discovered, the Nixons continued their tour, 
and next happily stood together atop the Badaling Great Wall.169 This famous 
landmark, which “stands about 23 feet high and dates back to the third century BC” 
proved a breathtaking sight for all the foreign visitors; the wall “stretches about 4,000 
miles-the distance from London to Chicago-from the Bay of Bohai on the Yellow Sea 
to Jiayguan in the Gobi desert”; while touring the area, Nixon reportedly commented, 
“Such a great people with such a great wall will surely have a great future.”170 This 
particular presidential outing elicited different responses from journalists, as Walter 
Cronkite reported receiving a shock when his “electric socks shorted out,” and Harry 
“Reasoner, describing the wall, said: “It’s…uh…it’s one of the two or three darnedest 
things I ever saw.”171 By this point on the diplomatic front, Henry Kissinger remained 
optimistic some form of an agreement would eventually be reached; the 
administration “ended up agreeing to do the communiqué release on Sunday night,” 
but American newsmen, tired of delays in receiving concrete information to report, 
were “becoming rather restless.”172  
On Friday morning, February 24, the Nixons visited the Forbidden City, but 
as Kissinger reported continued difficulties with finalizing the communiqué, that 
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afternoon’s discussions, which had been previously scheduled to begin at 3:00, 
actually started over an hour late; reaching no agreement, the Premier suggested they 
meet again at the airport before Nixon and most of the American party flew off to the 
lake resort city of Hangchow, south of Peking” the next day; despite worries over the 
semantical problems involved in designing the new American-Chinese document, the 
banquet hosted by the Nixons that evening went well.173 The next day, Zhou told 
Nixon he regretted discovering that during the Nixon’s official tour, “‘people got 
some young children there to prettify the tombs, and it was putting up a false 
appearance. Your press correspondents have pointed this out, and we admit that this 
was wrong. We do not want to cover up the mistake…. We have criticized those who 
did this.’”174 Meeting with Secretary of State Rogers that same day, Nixon made a 
point of telling him he expected cooperation in regards to the document Henry 
Kissinger had worked so hard to fashion.175 In fact, there at the “Ching Kiana Guest 
House” on West Lake, when Rogers expressed his unhappiness, Nixon said, “quite 
coldly: ‘Now, I expect the State Department to stay behind this 100 percent.’”176 That 
evening, the Nixons were entertained “at a banquet given by the Chekiang Province 
Revolutionary Committee.”177 On Sunday, the Nixons flew from Hangchow to spend 
the day in Shanghai, where the president capped off his official visit by attending that 
city’s Industrial Exhibition, and the First Lady “visited the Shanghai Municipal 
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Children’s Palace, where “her guide was Chang Hong, a fifth-grade student.”178 That 
evening, after attending their final formal banquet in the P.R.C., which was hosted by 
the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, “Premier Chou and Committee 
Chairman Chang Ch’un-ch’iao then accompanied the President and Mrs. Nixon to a 
cultural program of acrobatics in the Exhibition Hall.”179 
After officials from both countries formally announced the communiqué’s 
completion, Ziegler then briefed Nixon about early wire reports, which showed 
American media sources “treating it on a pretty straight basis not overly 
enthusiastic.”180 As a reminder “of how complex and perhaps necessary an endeavor 
such a diplomatic solution might be,” the new document’s creation had taken many 
hours of negotiations, with Kissinger and Qiao Guan-hua “working together far into 
the nights”; however, while “crafting the text was an ordeal” for Kissinger, Zhou, and 
their staffs, “Nixon and Mao were presented with drafts and simply signed off on 
them.”181 At the banquet held on the last evening of the president’s visit, the Premier 
promised to continue work toward improving relations between the two countries.182 
“This magnificent banquet marks the end of our stay in the People’s Republic of 
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China,” Nixon said in his toast that night. “‘We have been here a week. This was the 
week that changed the world.”’183 Before concluding his remarks, he also added: 
The joint communique which we have issued today summarizes the 
results of our talks. That communique will make headlines around the 
world tomorrow. But what we have said in that communique is not 
nearly as important as what we will do in the years ahead to build a 
bridge across 16,000 miles and 22 years of hostility which have 
divided us in the past.184 
Before leaving the P.R.C., Nixon presented his hosts with official gifts from 
America; these included: “a pair of musk oxen and two large redwood trees from 
California,” an assortment of “silver bowls, cigarette lighters, or cuff links with the 
presidential seal,” and “ceramic models of American birds.”185 In reciprocation, the 
Americans were to expect two pandas, a traditional gift from the Chinese rulers 
“meant to signal a peaceful relationship.”186 An interesting aspect of this entire affair 
from a diplomatic and geopolitical standpoint would be to consider that at the same 
time that the administration provided the American press corps members with “details 
about Milton and Mathilda, the pair of musk oxen” Nixon presented his new friends, 
“Kissinger was quietly giving the Chinese the fruits of American intelligence,” 
providing “classified information on Soviet military operations” and “about the state 
of discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union.”187 As the world at 
large perceived the situation, however, the Nixons had charmed their hosts and the 
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televised images of their sightseeing tours had captivated audiences around the 
globe.188   
By approving and signing the Shanghai Communiqué, “Mao had publicly 
approved a Chinese dialogue with the United States, or a pledge of continuing 
negotiations with a country he had long castigated as the ‘imperialistic’ enemy of 
‘peoples of the world.’”189 America’s allies expressed “almost unbridled glee. The 
trip was covered extensively on European television and in the press, and both 
journalists and government officials made no bones about their enthusiasm over the 
developments in Peking.”190 That week had been an excellent example of “terrific 
theater…it was mesmerizing. No one cared the visit was largely symbolic and light 
on content. It was great symbolism at play.”191 As the president headed back to 
America via Anchorage, Alaska, from Shanghai, “Nixon became concerned about the 
conservative reaction” to his recent work “after he saw a negative press report in the 
[Washington] Post, which made ‘a big point of the sellout of Taiwan’”; further study 
of later reports, according to Haldeman, showed “the general press was not playing it 
that way, and that we were really in very good shape.”192 Those against the idea of 
association with the communists, such as Patrick Buchanan, remained “very negative 
on the whole thing”; even though Kissinger tried his best to sway Buchanan’s 
position, Haldeman wrote, “it didn’t apparently do any good, since Pat stayed 
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negative.”193 Regardless of such reactions, the trip had been a resounding success, 
which led not only to “the establishment of a U.S. mission in China,” but also paved 
the way six years later, under the James Earl Carter administration, for fully 
established diplomatic relations between the two countries.194 In the coming decades, 
Nixon’s opening with the P.R.C. that spring in 1972 would subsequently become 
known as one of his finest accomplishments.195  
On February 28, 1972, President Nixon landed at Andrews Air Force Base, 
officially ending his historic trip.196 He had earned a seven-point gain in his overall 
approval rating, but after the Nixon administration’s media spectacular concluded, 
average American families quickly resumed their own life adventures.197 As most 
citizens had little time to ponder the possible long-term consequences of their leader’s 
recent foreign affairs venture, they soon simply focused their attention back on their 
own personal struggles and/or on the next big news story the networks beamed into 
their homes.198 In the following weeks, however, Nixon’s advisors began making 
predictions that by “November ‘the statesmanlike glow left over from Peking,’ if 
accompanied by an end of the war, would carry Nixon to reelection.”199 
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With his successful visit to the P.R.C. thus ended, one might conceivable ask 
what the media executives who had invested so much time and effort in this venture 
thought at the conclusion of the president’s fantastic journey. All the preparations had 
“been carefully tailored by the White House to keep the spotlight on the principals 
and away from any diversions”; an offer by the State Department to supply the 
entourage with an expert on Chinese culture had been spurned, and Nixon had chosen 
to forego extending invitations to either Senator Mansfield or Republican Leader 
Hugh Scott to accompany him, both of whom had studied Chinese culture. However, 
what many had already commented on stayed a proven fact—multiple network 
executives had been labeled as technicians for the journey, with NBC’s press 
contingent including “a London-based news producer, a news vice president, a Tokyo 
radio production manager and a New York producer.”200  
Other factors played into the quality and substance of footage captured for the 
viewing pleasure of the domestic audiences. When the newsmen filmed “at factories, 
managers made prepared speeches filled with impressive statistics and praise for 
Chairman Mao’s thought,” [yet they] “were suddenly shy when it came to answering 
questions.”201 “People spoke in shades of gray,” Ted Koppel remarked. “Nobody 
dared admit to a personal goal or aspiration. It was all about serving the country.”202 
As Press Secretary Ziegler also continuously reiterated that information discussed 
between Nixon and the Chinese leadership remained restricted, high profile 
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newscasters like Cronkite and Walters found themselves filling valuable airtime with 
simplistic humanistic stories, ranging from schoolchildren to acupuncture techniques. 
NBC’s John Chancellor complained about the lack of adequate transportation for 
foreign correspondents, but CBS’s Dan Rather, wandering along the public streets, 
managed to complete a good report concerning Chinese women.203 The vagueness of 
such stories was not long lost on the American population. At CBS’s New York 
studio, Ross Terrill, a young China scholar, quickly answered specific cultural or 
historical questions, with quite clear and easily understood explanations, while the 
celebrity anchors in the field looked both foolishly unprepared and embarrassingly 
uninformed. By Thursday, Richard Salant voted against airing a live broadcast of the 
Forbidden City tour, because as he stated, “I just thought…we’d had enough picture 
postcards the previous day from the Great Wall.”204 
Due to the secrecy of the actual summit talks, the national media’s reporters 
had either been forced to formulate their own news, or had opted to follow Mrs. 
Nixon around Beijing as she conducted her various sightseeing adventures.205 Koppel, 
who later served as a senior news analyst for National Public Radio (NPR), 
remembered, “It was, in those days, a profoundly depressing country. Except for the 
occasional splash of red provided by the Chinese national flag, everything else 
seemed to be a dirty, dull gray.”206 After also delving into the local culture, Reasoner 
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deemed the country “puritanical” after he discovered no X-rated movies existed in 
China, and Cronkite, when viewing a display of the impressive 40-mm rocket’s 
power by members of the PLA, commented, “that display has a particular poignancy 
for some of us here at CBS…because it was that weapon that killed George Syvertsen 
and Jerry Miller, our colleagues, in Cambodia…that very weapon.”207  
Regardless of its uniqueness and majesty, interest in the President’s historic 
journey to the P.R.C. soon waned.208 After a few days, despite revealing instances of 
Potemkin-esque touches by the Chinese hosts, the viewing public had simply digested 
all the information it was going to absorb about Nixon’s adventure inside the P.R.C. 
And, regarding the upcoming election cycle, as an article in The New Yorker 
concluded, “the payoff in American political terms appears to have been made in the 
first few days.”209 While viewers may have watched and enjoyed the President and 
First Lady’s exploits from afar, the journalists on assignment had worked themselves 
into a state of frustrated fatigue.210 Max Frankel, of The New York Times, who spoke 
on several radio programs, in addition to supplying his paper’s lead stories in a 
column entitled “A Reporter’s Notebook,” averaged only two and a half hours of 
sleep a night. He, “who wore two watches, one for Peking time and one for New 
York,” explained, “‘the only trip I can remember that was as grueling as this 
one…was LBJ’s round-the-world swing in 1967.’”211 “As the relentless pace of 
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sightseeing went on,” the Americans began to exhaust themselves, and their 
collective “reports, especially those of conservatives such as William Buckley, took 
on a sardonic edge.”212 The top network personnel, “who had gotten themselves listed 
as ordinary reporters, found themselves pressed into service to carry lights,” and 
while “Dirck Halstead…found that he was managing on bourbon and about one hour 
of sleep a night,” he soon also heard his despairing Chinese assistant plead, “‘Please, 
Mr. Dirck, you must get some sleep! You will die if you don’t!’”213 Due to Mao’s 
government having graciously provided one interpreter to guide and assist each pair 
of journalists, the language barrier had been somewhat alleviated for the hardworking 
news crews; however, while this was fine with most of the press corps members, 
more independently minded reporters disliked these arrangements; Theodore White 
was overheard grumbling, “It’s like having a possessive wife.”214  
Only a few days into the coverage, “there began to develop a certain feeling 
that the form outweighed the substance…[and] the U.S. press contingency soon 
began to complain about the lack of ‘hard news.’”215 As the Nixon administration 
failed to provide “daily press briefings and there was virtually no hard news about 
what was taking place in the high-level discussions,” this prompted NBC’s John 
Chancellor to state, “Never before had an American President traveled abroad in 
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peacetime under such a cloak of secrecy.”216 To some observers, this reflected, “a 
symptom of the administration’s paranoid and dismissive attitude toward a media 
corps it nonetheless monitored with a gimlet eye.”217 A somewhat disgruntled 
representative of Newsweek replied, “Here we are at one of the most critical junctures 
in postwar history…and the American people are getting no idea of what is likely to 
happen or even what is being discussed.”218 Reporters had no choice but to continue 
their vigils, waiting “for hard news to seep out of the closed-door meetings.”219 After 
covering Mrs. Nixon’s kitchen tour, one reporter fumed that “instead of meat and 
potatoes, we’re getting a few hors d’oeuvres,” and John Chancellor publicly voiced 
his own frustrations during a prime-time appearance by remarking, “The American 
people…are getting no real information at all.”220 While the president’s recent 
diplomatic actions inside Red China eventually got reported in a favorable light by 
the press, Patricia Nixon also left an excellent public impression as a “First Lady who 
talked to every Chinese she met as an equal and showed an intense interest in learning 
about China”; she “was a big hit everywhere she went.”221 
The adventure had been an excellent opportunity to study cultural differences. 
On one occasion, the Premier asked Nixon, “Don’t you think we eat soup?” after he 
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noted Nixon’s surprise that the “Chinese used spoons as well as chopsticks.”222 
Before February 1972, many Americans thought “China was a sort of outlaw among 
nations, she snarled at the rest of the world and evinced such contempt for it that 
many who spoke of the desirability of bringing her back into ‘the family of nations’ 
began almost to dread the day when this might happen.”223 Like Nixon, the foreign 
journalists covering this weeklong adventure had been learning about this alternate 
society; their impressions soon appeared in popular magazines, such as the article 
printed in Time, which noted, “the emphasis on the work ethic points up one of the 
key realities of life in the land of Mao. Despite the social upheaval created by the 
revolution, there still is much of the old Middle Kingdom in China today.”224 A 
contributor to U.S. News and World Report also remarked, “China at the present time 
has arrived at a stage, as Chairman Mao calls it, of the remarkable result of the people 
now having a bowl of rice a day. In other words, there is no longer famine in China, 
but nonetheless the standard of living is still exceedingly low.”225  
As both countries began expressing interest in renewing “officially sponsored 
people-to-people contacts,” one U.S. official explained the importance of such 
cultural exchange programs by stating, “The Chinese have a distorted view of 
America. Some of the leaders may have knowledge of this country, gained from 
intensive briefings, but they seem to have little understanding of what makes the U.S. 
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tick. Continuing visits by many Chinese would help correct this.”226 By 1972, while 
some Americans suspected the Chinese had started to outgrow “their xenophobia and 
their paranoia,” one contributor to The New Yorker believed his fellow citizens had 
also begun to change their own belief systems, by “casting aside the myths that have 
cost us so dear over recent decades.”227 While the recent visitors to the P.R.C. gleaned 
revealing cultural insights from their stay, the Chinese people themselves had gotten 
their own lessons in cultural awareness from this historical event. Before Mao’s 
decision to invite Nixon, Chinese society had been quite Xenophobic; “She bred a 
paranoid generation, renounced much of her past, tossed much of her culture on the 
trash heap, and disposed of those who showed even the least sign of remorse about all 
this”; however, the Chinese had “done a remarkable job of nation building since 
1949.”228  
After February 1972, major alterations to presumably solid worldviews 
became clearly evident. Nixon’s journey had ended, but newly opened diplomatic ties 
eventually led to a better understanding between the two formally bitter enemies. 
Although the Nixon administration remained secretive about the official content of 
the plenary sessions while the president had been in the P.R.C., colorful televised 
broadcasts had still enlightened the average Americans as to what life was like behind 
that bamboo curtain. Working within their restricted circumstances, the journalists, 
despite a lack of extensive prior knowledge of the Chinese, produced viable segments 
for the viewing pleasure of their domestic audiences back home. A sort of Asian 
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mania soon took over in the U.S. It suddenly became quite fashionable to eat food 
prepared in woks, and/or for average American citizens to emulate the dress and other 
cultural elements of the Chinese they had seen reflected in their television sets.229 
Over time, more citizens from both nations journeyed around the world for their own 
first-hand looks at the other mysterious society. Nixon’s journey to Beijing proved a 
major step toward the development of “full diplomatic relations between the U.S. and 
China,” and the results are clearly visible “absolutely everywhere today.”230 
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“Surely the trip is one of the most daring diplomatic exploits of modern 
times,” Christianity Today reported.1 The entire world watched as President Nixon’s 
February 1972 odyssey unfolded. His journey to the People’s Republic of China “was 
one of those rare political coups that seemed utterly impossible beforehand and 
unavoidably logical afterward.”2 As one journalist put it, “For more than a century 
America’s relations with China have veered sharply between feelings of love and 
hate–with hate being the dominant emotion since the Communists seized the 
mainland in 1949.”3 Nixon received the expected amount of “press criticism and 
complaints from the right that he had sold out Taiwan, but the more universal reaction 
to the Summit was enthusiastic approval.”4 His supporters stood by their man, 
however, as they “trusted him as they would nobody else on the subject of China. If 
Nixon said it was all right on this one you know it’s gotta be alright.”5 While a Louis 
Harris survey soon provided proof of the average citizen’s loyalty and faith by 
showing “that 73 per cent of the American people approved of the trip,” the venture 
even earned the President positive treatment from the Democratic-controlled 
Congress, as members “granted Mr. Nixon a ten-day grace period on his return to 
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consider new legislation.”6  In the month following his historic journey, it became 
clear at least one of Nixon’s fellow citizens appreciated his overseas attempts toward 
achieving greater world peace. The letter printed in The New Yorker read: 
If things go sour, Nixon will be in a fair position to disown 
responsibility. No one will be able to say that he failed to walk the 
extra mile; he flew twenty thousand miles, talked peace and 
brotherhood for a solid week, and conducted what must have been the 
most spectacular effort in personal diplomacy in history.7 
On the conservative front, while Pat Buchanan still wanted to resign his 
position, as he “did not agree with the Shanghai Communiqué” and thought his boss 
“had sold out to the communists in China–a theme that dominated conservative 
journalism and comment as soon as the trip ended,” William F. Buckley, who had 
written “‘Veni, Vidi, Victus’–we came, we saw, we were conquered” in the National 
Review, was also busily “organizing conservatives to ‘suspend support’ of Nixon 
because of his recent China trip.”8 By August 1972, “a number of conservative 
businessmen close to California Governor Ronald Reagan signed a public statement 
expressing great concern about Nixon’s détente policies.”9 Even though his 
discontented “conservative allies criticized him for abandoning his principles,” 
Nixon, having fully realized “the Cold War would get colder without talks,” had 
followed through with his original plans and accomplished the politically 
                                                 
6 “Nixon in China: The First Steps of a Long March,” Newsweek, March 6, 1972, 15. 
 
7 Richard H. Rovere, “Letter from Washington: February 27, 1972,” The New Yorker, March 4, 1972, 
105.   
 
8 Reeves, President Nixon, 433, 459. 
 
9 Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 303. 
 109
controversial diplomatic journey.10 Congressional Democrats expressed “somewhat 
grudgingly praise [for] the way Mr. Nixon handled himself on his trip”; one of his top 
political foes remarked, “Somehow at that distance he looked different. When he was 
over there he was ‘one of ours’ and we have to admit that he did darn well.”11 As for 
his opponents then “campaigning in the New Hampshire and Florida primaries, they 
found themselves almost entirely upstaged by the President’s activities.… In short,” 
as Newsweek reported, “everyone’s attention was focused on China.”12 
When taking into account the timing and importance of this historic event, one 
might easily question the possible ramifications Nixon’s decision had brought home 
for China’s nearest neighbors. It is only natural that modern readers would wonder 
just how officials in these nations reacted to his journey. An important fact to 
remember, as U.S. News & World Report mentioned at the time, is that there was a 
new “awareness, spreading all across the Far East, that a new kind of Asia is being 
shaped by events flowing out of Peking––and that every country in that big, important 
area is bound to be affected.”13 This highly publicized Nixon decision, most probably 
his crowning achievement while in office, played well across international lines. Most 
of America’s allies approved of his new geopolitical work and seemed “to recognize 
the intelligent preparation the presidential party made; sumptuous banqueting in 
public was not inconsistent with plain talk in private.”14  
                                                 
10 Andrew Halcro, “Palin should follow Nixon’s example,” Anchorage Daily News (Alaska), April 22, 
2007, J2. 
 
11 “Washington Whispers,” U.S. News & World Report, March 6, 1972, 10. 
 
12 “Nixon in China: The First Steps of a Long March,” Newsweek, March 6, 1972, 15. 
 
13 “After Peking Talks-New Shape of Asia,” U.S. News & World Report, March 6, 1972, 16. 
 
 110
Reactions to media coverage captured that week quickly materialized from 
around the world. While one French newscaster urged his countrymen to “watch 
these scenes carefully…for they will figure in your grandchildren’s history books,” a 
writer for Frankfurter, Germany’s Allgemeine Zeitung insisted the “structure of 
international affairs is being reshaped…. The switching of the center of conflict from 
Europe to Asia represents the true end of the second world war”; while further to the 
East, the “Scinteia, the independent-minded Rumanians” located in Bucharest, called 
Nixon’s trip “an important, positive act,” one Israeli diplomat also happily remarked, 
“For the first time in twenty years…the U.S. has outmaneuvered Moscow–and in a 
big way, too.”15 Other responses to the Nixon media spectacular ranged anywhere 
“from Albania’s outrage to Canada’s approval”; “South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, New Zealand, and Australia,” who all 
enjoyed “defense treaties with the United States…wondered what the [new] 
American commitment now meant.”16 South Koreans feared “the U.S. might make a 
deal resulting in removal of U.S. military forces” then protecting their sovereignty, 
but inside Pakistan, a country recently “humbled by India in war and torn by internal 
unrest,” officials, wishing for no additional troubles, simply wanted to ensure their 
citizens received “renewed aid from China and the U.S.”17 
A former French Premier named Edgar Faure reacted to Nixon’s startling 
move by stating, “It is not possible to envisage an equilibrium limited to three 
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countries of which two are Communist”; he also remarked, “there is also Japan, 
perhaps India, and then above all Europe. It becomes urgent to organize a genuine 
European diplomacy.”18 As for Great Britain, one American diplomat reported, 
because the president’s decision had hurt Prime Minister Edward Heath’s sensibilities 
so severely that “‘he never really recovered’ from Nixon’s not informing him on such 
major policy,” he subsequently turned his attentions toward “improving Britain’s 
relationship with the European Union.”19 Great Britain reopened full diplomatic 
communications with the P.R.C. on March 13, 1972.20 
In Indochina, official comments by the South Vietnamese on the American 
president’s recent diplomatic move were “restrained, but coffee shops in the capital 
were abuzz with talk that the U.S. might, in effect, be willing to sell South Vietnam 
down the river in order to strike a deal with China.”21 Various other allies of the 
P.R.C., “such as North Korea and North Vietnam,” countries where national leaders 
tended to lean “toward the Soviet camp” for guidance, “watched with alarm but 
muted their criticisms for fear of alienating their giant neighbor.”22 On the same day 
Nixon arrived in Beijing, the North Korean government located at Pyongyang 
“announced the departure of its Foreign Minister for high-level talks in Moscow.”23 
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Many people around the globe also waited to see how Taiwan would officially react 
to this rapidly altering geopolitical situation.  
When Mao personally discussed Chiang with Nixon in 1972, he told the 
American president, “The history of our friendship with him is much longer than the 
history of your friendship with him.”24 That relationship had certainly proven itself 
difficult and fear-ridden. In fact, by 1965, the Mainland Chinese had already waited 
sixteen long years, constantly on guard, because they believed Chiang and his new 
U.S. allies planned to attack them. Marshal Zhen Yi reportedly “told the international 
press ‘my hair has turned grey in waiting.’ But World War III never came.”25 While 
Nixon visited the mainland, “except for angry pronouncements from various 
government organs, life in Taiwan went on quite normally.”26 In only a few weeks, 
the Generalissimo “received ‘99.9 percent of the votes,’ [and] won re-election to the 
presidency of Nationalist China for “his fifth consecutive six-year term,” which 
“solaced the conservatives by symbolizing stability and continuity amidst the vast 
changes” occurring abroad.27 
On February 21, the first day of Nixon’s stay in the P.R.C., the Assembly of 
Nationalist China “voted to express criticism of his visit.”28 While Secretary of State 
William Rogers hurriedly assured leaders in Taiwan “that the U.S. will stand by its 
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commitments to defend the island against any mainland attack,” in a Newsweek 
article, Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted the situation would “certainly prompt [the 
Nationalist government’s] international isolation, if not fall.”29 Although The New 
Yorker printed Robert Shaplen’s “Letter from Hong Kong,” which stipulated, “The 
Chinese Nationalists in Taipei have, of course, protested loudly against the American 
move toward Peking,” relations between that nation and the U.S. continued to appear 
solid.30 “Government leaders and the wealthy were clearly worried” by Nixon’s 
recent trip; however, according to sources on the island, the mood in the country 
“appeared to be one of anxiety but not outright alarm…only one demonstrator 
carrying a hand-scrawled placard reading ‘Nixon–the Traitor’ showed up to protest in 
front of the American Embassy.”31 While Foreign Minister Chow Shu-gai publicly 
remarked, “The United States has assured us there will be no deals at our expense, 
and we must take Washington at its word,” U.S. News & World Report also informed 
its readers there remained “a measure of despair in Taipei––aggravated by frustration. 
Yet the lid has been clamped on any public expression of anti-Americanism.”32 
In the first few years of his presidency, although Nixon sought to lessen 
tensions between the U.S. and the P.R.C., to the extent of even ending patrols by the 
Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits, his official visit certainly marked “a low point in 
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the falling diplomatic fortunes of the Taiwan Nationalists.”33 The political tide had 
“risen against the Nationalist regime,” as evidenced by their first losing “their seat in 
the United Nations to the Chinese Communists,” and then, over subsequent months, 
officials there watched as “country after country…shifted diplomatic ties from Taipei 
to Peking.”34 “American support of Taiwan has been and will continue to be a bone in 
the throat of Peking,” wrote William J. Richardson in America, “and must either be 
swallowed or coughed up before any real working agreement can be reached between 
the United States and the People’s Republic.”35 Even though Mao’s government had 
“repeatedly declared the issue a Chinese affair, and that no foreign intervention into 
the matter would be tolerated,” Kissinger later reported he had told “the Chairman: I 
do not believe that this [the Taiwan issue] is a fundamental obstacle at this time to the 
normalization of our relationship.”36 Zhou Enlai certainly had “his eyes always on the 
main issue––[he] knew that the new relationship with the United States was more 
important than prevailing on the issue of Taiwan.”37 The subsequent joint release of 
the Shanghai Communiqué signaled for the entire world “the start of a new level of 
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Sino-U.S. relations and saw the U.S. indicating a withdrawal from Taiwan would 
eventually occur.”38  
Following the important U.N. vote of 1971, many nations altered their 
diplomatic practices regarding Taiwan and Beijing. According to Life magazine, “The 
real success or failure of the Peking mission may not be visible for months or years, 
when it will be manifest in responses to events yet unforeseen. A long march has 
indeed begun.”39 However, “the shifts in the international kaleidoscope are only 
beginning,” commented W. A. C. Adie in his May 1972 Asian Survey article.40 An 
earlier edition of U.S. News and World Report had also already mentioned, “The 
shape of all Asia, influenced in large measure by the U.S. ever since World War II, is 
being changed in ways that will have profound effect on every major power for years 
to come.”41  
The relationship between Taiwan’s Nationalists and the Japanese soon came 
into question; even though Japan was “its most important supporter and trading 
partner after the U.S.,” a Foreign Ministry senior official told newsmen because many 
in his country now believed Chiang’s government’s only authority rested on Taiwan, 
his nation would most likely soon shift official recognition to Beijing.42 On January 7, 
1972, Sato stated, “I have not been able to trust fully the United States since the 
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sudden announcement of the President’s plan to visit China.”43 Unhappy with their 
prime minister’s policies, “the Japan Communist Party (JCP)…demanded his 
resignation as well as Japan’s immediate recognition of the People’s Republic.”44 
“Even if the U.S. remains firmly behind the Nationalists,” a senior Japanese diplomat 
commented, “there is a very great danger that Japan will recognize Peking.”45 
Members of the Parliament’s lower house soon favored the establishment of formal 
relations with Beijing, and normal trade became disrupted, as “all but one of the 
Japanese shipping companies involved in the lucrative Taiwan trade canceled their 
regular schedules.”46 “It would be a strange bargain to lose Japan (having just 
recently jeopardized our relations with India) for the sake of initiating a dialogue with 
Peking,” noted Newsweek’s Brzezinski.47 
Because his authority had been so publicly undermined, Prime Minister Sato 
ultimately “resigned in the summer of 1972 and was replaced by Tanaka Kaknei, who 
moved rapidly to open up Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China.”48 
After this major shift in leadership occurred, the nation’s new U.S./China foreign 
policy was summed up “in one sentence: Japan would proceed with normalization of 
Sino-Japanese relations ‘at its own discretion’ while keeping the United States 
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appropriately informed.”49 Japan not only soon “sent missions to Hanoi and to 
Pyongyang and invited Brezhnev to Tokyo,” but Nixon’s trip had created such 
antagonism between Japan and Taiwan “that Japan Air Lines soon felt it necessary to 
take special precautions against sabotage on every flight to and from Taiwan.”50 After 
Tanaka’s government officially recognized “China’s sovereignty on Taiwan” by 
renewing ties with Beijing and severing those with the Nationalists in September 
1972, this allowed the new “bilateral relations to flourish in subsequent years.”51 
In India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reacted to Nixon’s foreign policy 
designs by emphasizing her government would “not allow China and America to 
decide what should happen in Asia.”52 Gandhi, a Soviet ally, considered Mao Zedong 
and his government the enemy, and “openly expressed the fear that the Peking 
summit was designed ‘to forge some sort of a new power group’”; her stern 
admonishment: “India will not be bound by any decision which seeks to dictate terms 
to Asian countries,” clearly reflected her deep concern.53 Historically, there had been 
no love lost between Nixon and Gandhi. He had disliked her since he concluded “she 
had not treated him with proper respect during a trip to the subcontinent before he 
became president.”54 In fact, Kissinger noted that some of his boss’s “comments 
about Indira Gandhi were ‘not always printable,’” as Nixon personally “despised her, 
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and he distrusted Indian policy statements.”55 Because the renewed cooperation 
represented a possible threat to “India’s new status as the major power in South 
Asia,” India’s leader warned both “the United States and China not to think they 
could collude in South Asia.”56 When questioned about “where Indo-U.S. relations 
went wrong after the talk all those years of an American desire to rely on India as a 
counterpoise in Asia to China,” Gandhi answered she supposed “U.S policy towards 
India changed when ‘U.S. policy towards China changed.’”57 Many people soon 
suspected the new India-Soviet friendship treaty, formerly “announced on August 8, 
1971, [came] as a partial response to Nixon’s [own] announcement of Chinese-
American rapprochement the previous month.”58 
Gandhi’s Russian allies certainly disapproved of the American commander-in-
chief’s ambitious diplomatic activities. “The…sight of President Nixon and of 
Chairman Mao conferring together should give the Kremlin leaders food for thought–
–and the food may be spicier than a fortune cookie,” remarked Newsweek’s 
Brzezinski.59 As the P.R.C.’s newest favorite enemy, the Soviets expressed 
unhappiness about the recent geopolitical affairs. While Kremlin officials “branded 
the Peking talks as part of an ‘anti-Soviet conspiracy by the U.S. and China and took 
the occasion to focus fresh attention on the heavy American bombing in Indochina,’” 
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it is also interesting to note that one Newsweek article reported, “some Soviet 
diplomats in the West hinted that the trip had sparked a review of the Kremlin’s own 
China policy,” and that “a few leaders close to Communist Party boss Brezhnev had 
begun to urge him to take a softer line toward Peking.”60 Izvestia, a Russian 
government newspaper, covered the Beijing arrival in two sentences, and evening 
news programming out of Moscow only “devoted about 30 seconds to the President’s 
meeting with Chou En-lai.”61  
The Cold War mentality of the West included the assumption that Mao’s 
“China was an obedient underling to the Soviet Union”; if Nixon reached a 
rapprochement with the Chairman, he also then “effectively weakened the Soviet 
position in the global play.”62 In actuality, the Russians had been experiencing 
difficulties with their southern brothers since the official Sino-Soviet split in 1961; by 
1969, as they “claimed that the Chinese [had already] invaded their border regions on 
at least ninety occasions,” leading to “periodic armed conflict” and “skirmishes that 
resulted in scores of casualties,” the Soviets understandably expressed concern in 
1971 when they learned their “uneasy Marxist ally…with a population of almost a 
billion” had openly welcomed the American leader.63 The hostile activity along the 
P.R.C.’s northern border meant that by “1970, China actually feared a Soviet invasion 
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and was ready to end its isolation.”64 During Nixon’s visit, the Premier told him that 
“tension between China and the Soviet Union…had reached the point that the 
Chinese were requiring families to dig underground shelters and the government was 
linking them together in a network to survive Soviet bombing.”65 
Bearing this information in mind, one understands how Mao believed he 
“desperately needed advanced western technology for his dilapidated military 
industry,” and how the Chairman’s own surprising diplomatic move seems to have 
met an end by serving as “a means of chilling Soviet designs in Asia.”66 Because both 
Nixon and Kissinger also believed any further elevations of Soviet power in Asia 
represented “far more of a threat to U.S. security than Mao’s gospel of a people’s 
war,” while Nixon continued to withdraw “U.S. forces to the rim of Asia, [he also 
remained]…convinced that the key to peace in the region [lay] in an understanding 
with China.”67 After Nixon concluded his visit to the P.R.C., Brezhnev accused the 
Chinese of approving “an immoral foreign policy and cited the Shanghai 
Communiqué…as supporting evidence; in his view, because each party had stated its 
own position without defining a common stand [this] made the whole document 
unprincipled.”68  
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When one remembers Nixon’s historic trip occurred while American military 
personnel were engaged in combat in Asia, one might ask how this visit and relations 
between the U.S., P.R.C., and U.S.S.R. governments all related to that troubling 
situation. In late December 1971, the U.S. had “bombed supply complexes in North 
Vietnam south of the 20th parallel for two days, to editorial and Congressional 
outrage,” but Kissinger later wrote, “No reply was received from China cautioning 
us—in itself a significant sign of dissociation by what had been considered until then 
the capital of world revolution.”69 Because American officials realized that “during 
the 1950s and early 1960, China [had been] Hanoi’s most enthusiastic backer,” they 
interpreted this muted response from the P.R.C. as meaning that nation’s leadership 
now remained “far more concerned over Soviet expansion into South Asia than it is 
fearful about the U.S. cranking up the war in Vietnam.”70  
In formal discussions that February 1972, Zhou informed Nixon and Kissinger 
that China continued to sympathize and support the North Vietnamese efforts, but he 
also implied his nation “would not take sides in the continuing negotiations” or 
“intervene militarily in the conflict.”71 Because support from the P.R.C. had already 
been marginalized due to limited resources, Kissinger later noted Mao’s government 
had “rejected any effort to ‘enmesh’ it in Indochina. Beijing was in effect washing its 
hands of the whole affair; Hanoi was on its own.”72 After Mao became “impatient 
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with Hanoi,” he “tossed its leaders a simple suggestion: Sign a peace treaty, regroup 
until after most Americans have left and then roll in.”73 As Nixon’s journey 
concluded, a U.S. News and World Report article stated the president remained 
hopeful that a friendlier P.R.C. might “use its influence to speed release of American 
prisoners in North Vietnam”; regardless of changes in policies emanating from within 
the P.R.C., the Soviets in Moscow persisted in their support of “Hanoi’s position but 
without fervor.”74 Though they initially supported Hanoi’s efforts, as time passed, the 
leaders in both Beijing and Moscow became increasingly restless on the entire issue, 
but “neither wanted to be perceived as derelict in its duty to its North Vietnamese 
ally, lest it lose support in the rivalry within the Communist world”; even though the 
P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. had offered the regime patronage in previous years, by 1972, 
both of these nations appeared “more than ready to make America an ally.”75 
The Nixon administration continued its involvement in Indochina, but because 
the president’s recent “trip frightened the Russians and the North Vietnamese,” this 
triggered fears in Hanoi that “they were in severe danger of being sold out by their 
larger allies.”76 The North Vietnamese, in their official comments, “flashed anti-
Peking signals…. While not specifically accusing China of collusion with the U.S., 
Hanoi declared that Washington was guilty of ‘dark plotting to carry out continued 
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neocolonialist war.’”77 In fact, leaders there reportedly “turned apoplectic at the sight 
of their main enemy shaking hands with their supposed patron in the north.”78 
Nixon’s venture prompted angry rebuttals in both “the Hanoi party paper Nhan Dan 
and in the central organ of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, Gia 
Phong”; while Nhan Dan “warned that Nixon ‘has gone to the wrong place…. The 
time when the imperialists lord it over the world is definitely gone. The time when the 
big powers browbeat smaller countries is ended for good,’” contributors to “Gia 
Phong added: ‘The destiny of Vietnam must be decided by the Vietnamese people 
themselves.’”79 
At the time Nixon initially took office, this Vietnam conflict had already 
“claimed the lives of 30,000 U.S. soldiers and more than one million Vietnamese”; by 
1970, the struggle had also “become the longest military engagement in American 
history.”80 In June 1972, although Nixon publicly announced that “no new draftees 
would be sent to Vietnam” and began troop withdrawals, he remained “the sworn 
enemy of antiwar protesters.”81 By the time of his re-election that November, 
although “half a million U.S. troops” had been involved in Indochina, all the efforts 
still showed “no light at the end of the tunnel”; by 1972, those involved had 
“dwindled ‘to just 16,000 non-combatant “advisers” active in Vietnam.’”82  While the 
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region ultimately fell a few short years later to the communist insurgents, the 
domestically destructive Watergate scandal ended Nixon’s official concerns about 
such foreign affairs issues.  
Believing the major China initiative represented “old news,” the three major 
American networks soon became obsessed with providing continuous live coverage 
of the Watergate scandal’s lengthy and tedious proceedings. For children and 
teenagers accustomed to viewing after school and early evening programming, this 
was a terrible situation. “I remember watching all those old men, with their buzz 
haircuts and dark suits, on our family’s black and white television set,” Patsy Jones 
recalled.83 She added, “They just sat around asking questions for hours.”84 “I was still 
a bit too young to appreciate the political implications, but I remember how it 
interfered with my TV viewing,” author Terry Mirll commented. “Those were the 
days before most folks had cable, and so there wasn’t a lot to choose from—three or 
four TV channels, tops. So for weeks on end, there was nothing on any of the 
channels except Watergate hearings, Watergate hearings, and more Watergate 
hearings. Who cared about E. Howard Hunt, G. Gordon Liddy, or John Dean III? I 
wanted Columbo!”85  
This domestic debacle not only left disgruntled viewers in its wake, but also 
assured Nixon a page in every future American history book discussing important 
events of the late twentieth century. Incredibly, after all the anti-war protest activities 
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and national social bickering that had occurred regarding the American involvement 
in Indochina, this particular news story actually had the power to mute “public 
response to the news that at long last America was leaving Vietnam.”86 Although the 
U.S. maintained “an interest in the independence of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, 
and it would continue to hold a protective nuclear shield over Japan as well as 
retaining close economic relations with that country,” an article in U.S. News and 
World Report stated, “The hope is, however, that the vital American interests in Asia 
could be preserved at far less cost and with much less intense commitment, 
financially and militarily.”87 People around the world soon realized: “China did not 
pressure North Vietnam to make major concessions to end the Vietnam War on terms 
favorable to the United States,” the U.S. did not openly advocate the abandonment of 
Taiwan’s ruling government or suggest a forced “return to mainland Chinese rule,” 
but the powerful U.S.S.R. of 1972 did eventually disintegrate.88 
As shown in the previous examples, President Nixon’s gutsy but controversial 
decisions of 1971 and 1972 caused major changes to occur in many nations. As a 
member of the Republican party, and described as being both ambitious and 
managerial, Nixon climbed his country’s political ladder of power while espousing a 
vehemently anti-Communistic viewpoint. This fact made it highly ironic it should be 
his administration that reached détente with Mao’s communistic P.R.C. in 1972. After 
Nixon responded to an official invitation to visit the P.R.C. in February of that year, 
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he became the first American commander-in-chief to visit a country not then 
recognized by his government.89 Stunning many across the country, Mr. Nixon’s 
plans symbolized quite a drastic shift in established foreign policy patterns. During 
the two decades before he assumed the presidency, thousands of military personnel 
had fought and died for nationally espoused democratic ideals to prevail in both 
Korea and Vietnam. Now, when their most recently and duly-elected president spoke 
of peace in Asia, many citizens hoped such a historic meeting between Nixon and the 
Chinese Chairman would alleviate tensions between the two countries.90  
Prior to his journey, Nixon often stated his fervent desire for world peace, and 
as spring 1972 approached, he emphasized his administration’s hopes for “identifying 
the points where the interests of the two nations can be merged or at least 
reconciled.”91 He knew one visit could not possibly heal the rift caused by over 
twenty years of mutual animosity and suspicion, but he firmly believed through 
meetings with the P.R.C.’s leadership that a working dialogue might be re-
established.92 He actually owed a great debt to the hard work and cooperation of both 
Kissinger and Zhou. Without their dedicated efforts in establishing an agenda for his 
visit, Nixon’s successful foray to Mainland China would never have occurred. 
 Despite his fully realizing the invitation would possibly aid Nixon’s 
“campaign as the ‘peace candidate’” in the next American election cycle, Chairman 
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Mao had also allowed the historic visit.93 True, this represented a bold and 
extraordinary move on his part, but the Chinese leader showed no aversion to such 
generosity. By spring 1972, the new direction in political winds had already proven 
themselves favorable to the P.R.C.; even before the president’s plane landed in 
Beijing, Mao’s government managed to win possession of the coveted United Nations 
assembly seat away from Chiang’s regime on Taiwan.94 It is also interesting to note 
that by early February 1972, despite all the planning which obviously went into 
preparing the president’s way to Beijing, officials at the White House had still 
provided the American public with little substantial information about what the event 
would actually entail. This, of course, runs counter to the more modern concept of 
open media coverage, but that was the essence of the Nixon administration. 
Nixon later wrote that during their “last long session in the guest house in 
Peking, the Premier told him, ‘You have risked something to come to China.’”95 
Commenting on how his guest’s personal political record “showed great defeats, 
victories, and comebacks,” Zhou also told Nixon, “adversity is a great teacher and 
that men who travel on a smooth road all their lives do not develop strength”; 
regarding these sentiments, Nixon later wrote: “From one who had endured the Long 
March, I considered that to be an unusually high compliment.”96 In February 1972, at 
the conclusion of his stay in the P.R.C., Nixon stated, “There is not reason for us to be 
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enemies,” and Zhou had also proclaimed, “The gate to friendly contact has finally 
been opened.”97 After many hours of negotiations, the U.S. and the P.R.C. 
successfully issued a joint communiqué. In an issue of The New Yorker, Richard H. 
Rovere wrote the finished product pleased: 
just about everyone but the Nationalists on Taiwan and certain Maoist 
factions outside China. The only large disagreements were over the 
war in Vietnam and the unreadiness on our part to extend diplomatic 
recognition to Peking. On most other matters, understanding was 
reached.98 
That important week in February 1972, both President Nixon and Premier 
Zhou had continuously chimed the same theme—“their nations had common 
geopolitical interests to offset conflicting ideological beliefs.”99 “Although still a 
relatively poor country,” Newsweek noted at the time, “China has elbowed its way 
into the world’s big-power club”; the article further stated, “under the pragmatic 
leadership of Chou En-lai––and prodded by fears of the Soviet Union—Peking has 
now launched an ambitious diplomatic offensive as well.”100 “As China grows in 
power,” Ross Terrill predicted, “her ambitions will increase…. China will not always 
be in a condition of relative weakness…having ‘stood up,’ China is likely to ‘stretch 
out.’101 After all the hard work by diplomats on both ideological sides, and after 
American and Chinese national media sources provided hours of exciting coverage 
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for their interested citizens, the adventure had ended well. The entire world now 
understood future communications between the U.S. and the P.R.C. promised to be 
both open and cordial.  
By even initially considering a journey to China, Nixon had risked his 
political credibility; but by March 1972, just a few months before American voters 
would once again elect an executive officer, the entire trip had proven itself a 
successful gamble.102 A writer for Newsweek noted Nixon had never undertaken “a 
major political or diplomatic sally that won him so many favorable press notices as 
last week’s ‘journey for peace.’”103 The Chinese “may well have calculated,” a 
contributor to The Nation also reflected, “that only a President elected with the 
support of conservative and right-wing elements could afford to go even this far in 
reaching an understanding with them.”104 As he returned home that spring, Nixon 
realized his recent diplomatic attempt had been successful. He also thought this fact 
would aid his campaign efforts later that fall; as an astute politician, Nixon certainly 
understood that he could potentially collect rich political rewards for his having 
accomplished productive summit talks with the powerful Mao Zedong.  
 Despite Nixon’s recent and daring move in foreign affairs, his administration 
faced continued hostility from both its usual critics and anti-war protesters, but “as 
the partisan mudslinging so a part of American politics began once again, the 
president found himself taking political shrapnel from all directions”; he clearly 
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recognized the general ‘antiwar movement threatened his chances for reelection.’”105 
Though “he had virtually eliminated the draft” and been “slowly withdrawing troops 
from Vietnam, still he was the sworn enemy” of protesters, such as Jane Fonda, who 
proclaimed: “American people don’t like to be lied to. The man who is at the head of 
our country is not telling us the truth.”106 Regardless of such vocal opposition and 
“his unpopularity in the press, Nixon successfully ran for a second term,” and 
defeated his Democratic rival, Barry Goldwater, “in one of the greatest landslides in 
American political history”; however, the Watergate scandal all too soon caused his 
ultimate downfall.107 “All politicians have been known to have wily ways…to get 
things and learn things about their opponents,” Patsy Jones stated. “Unfortunately for 
Nixon, he just got caught up in all that mess.”108 
After many long months of severe political difficulties, Nixon finally told his 
chief of staff, Alexander Haig, he “would resign but it would be with dignity and with 
no rancor”; the former president remembered commenting, “Well Al, I really screwed 
it up, didn’t I?” but then noted, “He didn’t have to answer.”109 In his final address as 
acting president, Nixon stated: 
We have unlocked the doors that for a quarter of a century stood 
between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. We 
must now ensure that the one-quarter of the world’s people who live in 
                                                 
105 Barron, Richard Nixon, 79; Power Plays video. 
 
106 Power Plays video. 
 
107 Sam Fogg, “The Story of Richard Nixon: His Political Career,” The Houston Chronicle, August 9, 
1974, 1; PBS; Ken Towery, The Chow Dipper (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1994), 281. 
 
108 Jones interview. 
 
109 Richard Nixon, PBS. 
 
 131
the People’s Republic of China will be and remain not our enemies but 
our friends.110  
After the camera lights dimmed that evening, the president and his family made their 
final preparations for leaving the White House and returning to California. The 
former commander-in-chief later remarked: “There is no way that you could 
apologize that is more eloquent, more decisive, more finite, or to say that you are 
sorry, which would exceed resigning the presidency of the United States.”111 As his 
official service to the nation neared its conclusion, Nixon still believed in helping the 
average working men and women of America. As one of his final acts, he “signed 
legislation extending a program of special aid for the jobless in high unemployment 
areas and providing cost-of-living increases in benefits for aged, blind and disabled 
persons.”112  
On August 9, 1974, Don Irwin’s article in The Houston Chronicle pointed out 
that “never––until the Watergate scandals drove the Nixon administration to its 
inglorious end––has a President been forced out before a term expired.”113 In 
Washington and around the country, many politicians blamed Nixon for his own 
downfall. They believed “he could have deflected the entire scandal at the outset 
merely by declaring he would get to the bottom of the break-in at Democratic 
National Committee headquarters and deal summarily with anyone in his 
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administration who might be involved.”114 Back in the former president’s hometown 
of Whittier, California, citizens gave an inquiring reporter mixed reactions about 
Nixon’s official resignation. While one housewife named Nancy Ward commented, “I 
thought it was coming, thought it was for the best. I feel sorry for him but that is the 
way it is,” a man named Robert Durham remarked, “I think it is a good thing. He has 
had a rough go in the press. Resignation is the healthiest thing for the country and the 
economy.”115 Years later, Walter Cronkite also stated that Watergate had once again 
proven “that it’s not the original sin but the cover-up that gets our politicians or any 
of us into trouble. People understand making mistakes, but they don’t understand 
lying about them afterwards.”116 
 Regardless of how powerful or influential someone is in life, it is only a 
matter of time before his or her official policies become altered by the next 
generations. As noted earlier, neither Mao nor Zhou was a young man in 1972. 
Though “Mao was a sickly old man” when he talked with Nixon for that historic hour 
in February 1972, he had still been “the most powerful leader of the most populated 
nation on Earth. He could snap his fingers, and his troops would kill thousands of 
people.”117 By 1974, however, while Mao had continued to maintain his political 
viability and “reportedly developed the Three Worlds theory, his thoughts concerning 
the then developing international situation,” Nixon had resigned his office in 
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disgrace.118 In 1976, when his loyal Chinese Premier “lay dying, Mao, who for years 
had been largely a recluse, went to the hospital” and “was the last person except 
Zhou’s doctors to speak with him.”119 Until his own death later that same year, “Mao 
remained the pivotal force in China.”120 Within four years of President Nixon’s initial 
journey to the P.R.C., both the Chairman and his Premier had passed away, and “a 
new regime more inclined to economic rather than ideological goals took over.”121  
In early November 1993, Nixon again visited the P.R.C. Surveying his 
surroundings, the former president commented: “‘The growth of this place is really 
unbelievable. And you know,’ he said quietly, ‘I like to think that I had something to 
do with it.’”122 For modern visitors to the P.R.C., living in an era “in which Chinese 
cities are populated by Starbucks, Buicks and Pizza Huts, it can be difficult to recall 
just how shuttered and remote the country once was.”123 It is important to remember 
that when Nixon’s entourage arrived in Beijing, the Chinese “did not even have a 
copying machine. Today, they make millions of computers. Instead of denouncing 
American imperialism, China adopted a new slogan: ‘To get rich is glorious.’”124 By 
1994, years after the deaths of Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou, Nixon still fervently 
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believed it remained in America’s best interests to retain a healthy relationship with 
China. “The Chinese have long memories,” he wrote. “We must not poison the 
friendly relationship we risked so much to establish when we opened the door to 
China twenty-one years ago.”125 Following Mao’s death, his political successors 
instituted far-reaching reforms, which have allowed China to experience great 
economic success; in 2006, the nation reportedly ran a trade surplus of $260 billion 
with the U.S.126 While these changes caused the disappearance of famine and 
deprivation on a mass scale, according to one recently published account, the art of 
repression is still being practiced in China, which “may, in the end, be what remains 
of Mao’s legacy.”127 
In February 1972, as part of his desire to achieve new levels of world peace 
and diplomatic stability, Nixon traveled to the communistic P.R.C.128 This important 
foreign affairs move eventually not only paved the way toward successfully ending 
American troop involvement in the Vietnam War, but it also occurred prior to the 
domestically explosive Watergate scandal, which destroyed Nixon’s political 
career.129 After the former president passed away in New York City in 1994, millions 
around the world watched a live broadcast of his funeral proceedings.130 Some of the 
memorial statements deserve recognition for their uniqueness. Robert Dole, a 
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Republican from Kansas, proclaimed: “Whereas, because of his efforts as President to 
improve relations with the then-Soviet Union, to bring China out of isolation, and to 
forge peace in the Middle East, Richard Nixon more than earned the title of 
peacemaker.”131 While the comments printed in the official record included, “I 
believe history will treat Richard Nixon well and with much interest,” and “While his 
Presidency will be debated for years to come, any person sharing his time could not 
escape his reach, from his international efforts in China, Vietnam, and the former 
Soviet Union, to his national efforts of revenue sharing, rebuilding our cities, and 
protecting our environment,” Kissinger, the former president’s valued assistant, spoke 
the following words at his former boss’s funeral service: “He dared 
confrontations…he bore with some pain the disapproval of long-time friends and 
allies over relaxing tensions with China and the Soviet Union.”132 Adding his 
thoughts as a voice-over for the televised coverage that day, Nixon biographer 
Stephen Ambrose also publicly remarked: “He became not just an elder statesman. To 
everyone’s amazement except his, he’s our beloved elder statesman.”133  
When asked about this particular president, many Americans easily recall the 
endless hours of televised hearings they watched from their living rooms, or perhaps 
visualize once again the moment on August 8, 1974, when they witnessed Nixon’s 
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resignation speech.134 Younger Americans may simply state Watergate or not even 
recognize Nixon as a former U.S. president if questioned about him.135 It is indeed a 
rare person who gives Nixon credit for his China initiative’s valuable contributions to 
world history.136 In late February 1972, President and Patricia Nixon visited the 
People’s Republic of China. While Nixon cautioned the American public about 
unrealistic enthusiasm and optimism before he left on his epic journey, and while he 
fully understood that significant differences in worldviews were not likely to simply 
vanish, he clearly realized and “emphasized peace depended on major powers having 
the capacity to communicate in a non-confrontational manner with one another about 
their differences.”137 Inside negotiation rooms in Beijing that week, American and 
Chinese officials successfully reopened diplomatic channels, and the possibility for 
real peace in the region became more concrete.  
A large press contingency, working eighteen-hour days, followed the Nixons’ 
every step. Many observers recognized that the commander-in-chief had risked his 
entire political career by attempting such a venture, because the controversial concept 
ran completely at odds with formerly established national foreign policy patterns. In 
retrospect, the Nixon administration made several mistakes in choosing who would be 
allowed to travel in their entourage to Mao’s domain. That spring, although American 
network executives sent their top anchors to cover the exciting, groundbreaking 
event, few, if any, of those chosen to accompany the president had extensive personal 
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knowledge of either Chinese culture or history. Domestic audiences soon realized the 
substantive explanations for what they were viewing on their television screens were 
actually emanating from a handful of Sinologists who had been left behind in the U.S. 
The president’s well-established practice of maintaining high personal levels of 
secrecy when conducting his personal affairs also played a part in this unfolding 
geopolitical drama. In efforts to protect the integrity of the world leaders’ discussions 
from dilution, the network coverage suffered; this meant U.S. viewers were ultimately 
provided with long-distanced flash and hype, rather than stories based on true 
substance.  
In only a few years, contact between the U.S. and the P.R.C. increased 
dramatically, and the troubling Vietnam experience had concluded. Unfortunately, by 
this time, American domestic troubles had also destroyed Nixon’s presidency. In 
1974, when remarking about the scandal that led directly to his resignation, Nixon 
remarked: “The way I tried to deal with Watergate…is a burden that I shall bear for 
every day of the life that is left to me.”138 On April 11, 1993, former president Nixon 
commented: 
I will be known historically for two things—Watergate and the 
opening to China. One bad, one good. It’s not fair, considering that we 
worked so hard on so many other things like détente with the Russians, 
the war on cancer, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency]…but 
those two things are going to stand out, and that’s the way it is.139 
Former President Gerald Rudolph Ford believed, prior to Nixon’s Watergate troubles, 
“his breakthrough to China was his major achievement, and he was justifiably proud 
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of what he had accomplished. He was riding high, at his pinnacle.”140 In 1997, a few 
years after Nixon’s death, Walter Cronkite also publicly acknowledged the former 
president’s accomplishment in February 1972 by stating, “The Nixon trip to China 
was one of the great diplomatic moments of all time. It was an act of great political 
courage.”141 Through all of Nixon’s many personal achievements, and often fully 
televised shortcomings, average Americans and members of the national media had 
waited, watched, and then tried to decipher the meanings behind his often quite 
controversial political moves.  
After the networks had broadcast images of his retreating helicopter, and 
America had welcomed his successor, President Ford, into the White House, Nixon’s 
second tumultuous term finally ended. As for his treatment during the Watergate 
scandal, Nixon reflected in 1990 that, “It was not enough for my critics to say that I 
had made terrible mistakes. They seemed driven to prove that I represented the 
epitome of evil itself.”142 When he left Washington on August 9, 1974, climbing 
“aboard a helicopter for a ride to the airport and a flight home to San Clemente, 
California,” Nixon commented, “Always give your best. Never get discouraged; 
never be petty; always remember, others may hate you, but those who hate you don’t 
win unless you hate them, and then you destroy yourself.”143 William Safire, a former 
Nixon era speechwriter, has since noted, “The Nixon administration with all its 
mistakes did some wonderful things, started some wonderful things, and Nixon as a 
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man I think redeemed himself at the end.”144 The former president had certainly 
possessed a unique personality, which Safire later described by providing a piece of 
seven-layer cake analogy; he commented, “If you’re going to take a piece of Nixon, 
it’s not fair to work along one layer. You just gotta take your fork, and go right down 
that whole cake. And take the bitter with the sweet.”145 Whether those that served 
under him considered him a hard gem, as in H.R. Haldeman’s case, or as a lump of 
soft dessert, as in the Safire analogy, Charles Colson remembers his former boss as “a 
very hard-driving brilliant demanding visionary kind of leader. When he was bad, he 
was really bad, and when he was good, he was great.”146 
After suffering a major stroke, Richard Milhous Nixon passed away in New 
York City on April 22, 1994, at the age of 81.147 During his presidential terms, he 
accomplished both important domestic and foreign policy objectives. Under his 
administration, America achieved détente with Chairman Mao Zedong’s Chinese 
communists. Inheriting the Oval Office after several of his Democratic presidential 
predecessors had deeply involved the American military in Asian affairs, Nixon 
thought the time had come for his country to have the courage to take the first 
precarious steps toward better diplomatic stability in that region. Despite obvious 
ideological differences between the U.S. and the P.R.C., the new American president 
concluded he needed to actively pursue some type of peaceful negotiations with 
Mao’s government. 
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Richard Nixon remained focused on progress for America throughout his 
presidency. In his “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign 
Policy for the 1970s,” he had already been thinking about overtures to the P.R.C.’s 
leaders, because on February 18, 1970, he stated, “The Chinese are a great and vital 
people who should not remain isolated from the international community. In the long 
run, no stable and enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution 
of this nation of more than 700 million people.”148 When presenting his second report 
on February 25, 1971, he noted that, “each of the major powers of the Pacific 
region—Japan, the USSR, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States—is 
faced with difficult decisions in adjusting its policies to the new realities of East 
Asia.”149 The following year, on the night of January 20, 1972, only a few weeks 
before he began his historic journey to the P.R.C., Nixon made the following remarks 
in his State of the Union address: 
America has an important role to play in international affairs, a great 
influence to exert for good. As we have throughout this century, we 
must continue our profound concern for advancing peace and freedom, 
by the most effective means possible, even as we shift somewhat our 
view of what means are most effective.150 
In what he believed would be in the best long-term interests of the American 
people, Nixon took a most historic and dramatic diplomatic step during the early 
1970s. By accepting Chairman Mao Zedong’s invitation in mid-1971, and by 
disregarding the domestic opposition to his China initiative, and the many blatant 
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personal criticisms he received in the popular press, the American president bravely 
reached out his hand and successfully reopened the fragile lines of communication 
with the communistic P.R.C. in 1972. After Richard Nixon made the courageous, 
albeit politically controversial, decision to attend the Beijing summit meetings in 
February 1972, many other countries then began to reexamine their own rigid Cold 
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